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The negotiated nature of South Africa’s transition to democracy in the 1990s entrenched 
the economic inequities of the Apartheid era and posed an empowerment challenge to the 
ANC. Economic empowerment, as a from of economic nationalism, is not a new problem 
however, and historical precedent is particularly relevant in the case of Afrikaner 
empowerment in the early Union period through to the height of the Apartheid system.  
Economic empowerment is understood in this thesis as a politically mediated process 
promoting the economic interests of a particular group. This process occurs within the 
broader frame of nationalism and is generally promoted in times of hegemonic crisis and 
attempts to remake the political order.  
 
While Afrikaner and African nationalism share common political tenets the nationalist 
process in each case emerged and developed in different socio-economic environments. 
Afrikaner nationalism arose out of the great social changes caused by the Anglo-Boer 
War of 1899-1902 and the rapid industrialisation that followed the outbreak of World 
War I.
1
 Largely agriculturally dependent Boers in the Boer Republics of the Transvaal 
and Orange Freestate were displaced through increasing commercialisation. Pushed to the 
urban centres into marginalised economic positions they were highly receptive to the 
ethno-political mobilisation of Afrikaans speakers who expanded the earlier discourses of 
Afrikanerbond to encompass all Afrikaners as a single nation. 
                                                 
1
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African nationalism in South Africa arose as a response to the political and economic 
crisis developed over the decades of Apartheid policy’s disenfranchisement of the 
African majority, and focused on the liberation of the African majority. Upon coming to 
power within the Government of National Unity, however, the nature of its nationalist 
project shifted towards the establishment of an inclusive nation, with reconciliation and 
redress high on the agenda.  
 
The debates around nationalism and economic empowerment largely reflect the broader 
historiographical debates within South African history writing and are informed by their 
ideological shifts in approaches. Early Afrikaner ideologues traced the thread of 
Afrikanerdom back 180 years to the Voortrekkers
2
 and called upon an underlying Volk 
unity that was spurred into an active nationalist response by events such as the South 
African War. From this perspective the rise of Afrikaner nationalism was seen to have 
occurred as a direct consequence to events such as the South African War, the 1914-1915 
Rebellion and the Jameson Raid as they evoked an explosion of ethnic solidarity and 
recognition of Volk unity. Depicting the rise of the Afrikaner Volk as pre-ordained, 
nationalist histories highlighted the struggle of the Afrikaner to empower himself in the 
face of hostile British and African resistance. British domination of the South African 
economy was seen as the greatest obstacle to the realisation of Afrikaner empowerment. 
In 1948 the National Party came to power and inherited a strong economy, allowing for 
state intervention and the wide-scale empowerment of Afrikaners. 
                                                 
2
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A new approach to Afrikaner nationalism was brought forward by Marxist historians who 
promoted the use of a structuralist and class-based approach to historical analysis. A 
structuralist approach places nationalism within a broader framework of the operation of 
the state and its institutions, class formation and their political agency, and the processes 
of capital accumulation.
3
 These elements were seen to operate in relation to each other 
and as exerting different forms of control over each other, both overtly and obscurely. 
From this perspective, control of the state was an important political goal of nationalist 
movements. 
 
A major contribution from the Marxist perspective came from O’Meara, whose 
comprehensive examination of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism through economic logics 
presented a detailed picture of political institutions of Afrikaner empowerment. 
O’Meara’s location of the development of Afrikaner nationalism within the changing 
economic realities of South Africa highlights the importance of class based capital 
mobilisation and accumulation within imperially-shaped economic structures as a vehicle 
for the promotion of nationalist sentiment.
4
 From O’Meara’s perspective, economic 
empowerment is elucidated as an integral aspect of nationalist reproduction. Tracing the 





century, O’Meara shows how ethnic sentiment was evoked through class-based grass 
roots cultural and economic institutions, and how these platforms were increasingly 
utilised by the Broederbond to rally political support around its Afrikaner agenda. The 
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National Party’s entrance into state power with the Labour Party in the Pact Government 
of 1923 produced the first state-driven empowerment for Afrikaners. The Pact 
government’s interventions in the economy featured ‘civilised labour polices’ which 
attempted to secure rights (particularly the allocation of employment opportunities and 
the setting of wage levels) for Afrikaner labour in the face of skilled African labour. The 
Pact government further promoted state corporations such as (Iskor and Eskom) and put 
into place tariffs on foreign goods and sectoral control boards in order to protect the 
interests of its voting bloc and promote national capital to loosen the hold of British 
mining capital over the economy.  
 
Further Marxist contributions came from, Kaplan, Davies, Morris and O’Meara as they 
examined the nature of the state between 1923 and 1948, paying particular attention to 
the state promoted empowerment of Afrikaner interests.
5
 Examining the particular class 
based political and social formation that gave rise to the particular political shape of the 
state and its form of hegemony, Kaplan et al showed how Afrikaner interests were 
represented within the Pact government and how national capital was promoted in an 
attempt to reduce the control of British capital. The significance of the Pact period in 
particular as the coming to power of Afrikaner interests within a ruling coalition, lies in 
the economic empowerment directed from the state through the enactment of policies. 
This marked a shift from earlier efforts at grass-roots empowerment effected by 
Afrikaner cultural/political institutions.  
 
                                                 
5
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A significant break from this approach came when Herman Giliomee, an Afrikaner 
historian, showed that the rise of Afrikaner nationalism was far from inevitable, even 
within the context of events such as the South African War, the 1914-1915 Rebellion and 
Jameson Raid. Giliomee showed that a small political elite actively used these 
‘precipitants’ to mobilise ethnic support and solidarity in order to win political support. 
This support was mobilised in particular for economic imperatives of an ethnically 
similar interest group of farmers, and was not nationalist in nature from the start. 
Giliomee identifies the earliest processes of Afrikaner economic empowerment at the 
Cape,
6
 as beginning in the in late 19
th
 century. The economic imperatives of Afrikaans 
speaking wine and wheat farmers at the Cape and their increasing conflict with British 
merchants who moved their produce onto the international market drove Afrikaners to 
seek protection at a political level. Ethnic sentiment was promoted as a way for a 
Afrikaans speaking farmers to rally political support for their economic interests. 
Between 1850 and 1890 these farmers sought increasing protection for their products in 
the face of greater merchant hostility and sharp economic fluctuations. They further used 
ethnically framed conflicts between the district banks and the British Standard Bank to 
mobilise capital among Afrikaners, enabling the creation of trust funds and later, 
institutions such as Santam. Giliomee views the great national events such as the Boer 
War and national responses to international events such as South Africa’s involvement in 
World War I and the ensuing rebellion as precipitants
7
 which were deliberately 
politicised in order to draw support for ethnic mobilisation of capital. The precipitants by 
                                                 
6
 Giliomee, H. ‘Western Cape farmers and the beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870 – 1915’, 
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7
 Giliomee, ‘Western Cape farmers and the beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870 – 1915’, p. 
62. 
 10 
themselves were not enough to create nationalist sentiment. Giliomee’s contribution is 
significant in the emphasis it places on political actors’ role in the creation of nationalist 
sentiment. At the Cape this role was played by a small intellectual elite that was 
ultimately instrumental in the establishment of Afrikaner institutions such as the 
Nasionale Pers and Santam.  
 
Since the 1990s, historical approaches have attempted to bridge the liberal-marxist 
debate, taking into account both economic and social factors. Fine and Rustomjee 
combined a synthesis of theoretical approaches with own empirical research to give a 
detailed account of the interplay between social and economic factors in state-directed 
empowerment strategies from the Pact government to the late Apartheid era.
8
 Bridging 
the liberal-marxist debate, Nattrass and Seekings explored the policies of empowerment 
through the examination of wage levels, education and social welfare spending. Their 
approach takes into account social dynamics as well as economic logics stemming from 
their use of empirical research.
9
 Viewing the Apartheid system as distributional regime 
that emerged to protect white interests and secure continued economic growth, Nattrass 
and Seekings place great importance on the government’s promotion of education and its 
regulation of the labour market as central spaces for empowerment.  
 
In the early 1990s, as the ANC emerged in the dominant position from the transitional 
Government of Unity, the direction of the new South Africa began to take shape. Under 
                                                 
8
 Fine, B. & Rustomjee, Z. The Political Economy of South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1996). 
9
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Nattrass, N. ‘Controversies around Capitalism and Apartheid in South Africa: An Economic Perspective’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 17,4, (Dec 1991), pp. 654-677. 
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the slogan of ‘national unity’ the ANC focussed politics on national reconciliation and 
redress, and economic policy on neo-liberal ideological frameworks of growth and 
development. Black Economic Empowerment, was envisaged as an instrument for the 
transformation of the structural inequalities of the economy and the distribution of wealth 
away from whites into the hands of a black elite.  
 
The ANC’s efforts at transformation, redress and empowerment brought the issue of 
economic empowerment to the forefront once again. Dealing with the deep economic and 
social inequality in post-Apartheid South African society is a historical problem and as a 
primary tool of transformation, Black Economic Empowerment as a policy needs 
examination within the framework of economic nationalism. BEE’s origins are located in 
the early empowerment efforts within the homelands in the 1950s under Apartheid. With 
legislative barriers preventing expansion, black business remained largely informal but 
increasingly organised in business associations lobbying for the creation of a more 
enabling economic environment for black business and the redistribution of wealth 
creating capacity into black ownership.
10
 These early forms of BEE informed ANC 
thinking and state-directed BEE was first envisaged in this period as a means of ensuring 
that blacks acquired a stake in the capitalist economy. BEE was promoted as an 
alternative to the socialist rhetoric of many of the ANC alliance which encompassed the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP).  
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 Sidiropoulos, E. ‘Black Economic Empowerment’, Spotlight, (South African Institute for Race 
Relations, September 1993). 
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Historiographical debates around BEE are focused primarily in two ways. The first is a 
broad empirical approach which examines BEE within the framework of neo-liberal 
economics espoused by the ANC since coming to power. Southall’s work on the subject 
is perhaps the most extensive and has provided a strong basis for continued analysis of 
BEE. Placing BEE in political focus, Southall has described the development of BEE 
policy and its political and economic consequences. Further debate around BEE is most 
primarily promoted by the media, with economic focus newspapers leading the way. The 
second focus on BEE occurred within left-wing criticism of the ANC’s espousal of neo-
liberal economic policies and its abandonment of redistributive policies. This literature 
focuses on the ineffectiveness of strategies such as BEE in tackling the vast inequality 
within South African society.
11
    
 
This thesis aims to compare BEE with the economic empowerment strategies of 
Afrikaner nationalism in order to root discussion around Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment within a context of economic nationalism. This approach avoids narrow 
critiques of BEE as affirmative action and provides a fresh historical perspective to the 
ANC’s efforts at transformation and redress. The comparison allows for insight to the 
different levels of success achieved by the economic nationalist strategies of Afrikaner 
empowerment and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment. This thesis explores 
micro-studies to illustrate the complex issues raised by empowerment policies of 
Afrikaner (post 1924) and African nationalism (post 1994). In particular this serves to 
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offer an alternative perspective the more common broad political approaches to BEE and 
highlights the policy’s effect at a micro-level.  
 
In so doing it will examine Black Economic Empowerment within a broader context of 
African nationalism and the ANC’s stated political and economic aims of redress, wealth 
redistribution and equitable economic and social conditions, while not losing sight of the 
more narrow goals of BEE itself. The ANC’s approach to the transformation of the social 
economy of South Africa represents a national resolution in the form that Morris 
describes as a ‘two nation’ strategy. This strategy attempts to marshall the support of 
economic and political elites, the costs of which are passed on to the remaining sectors of 
the population.
12
 Under the ANC’s broader Growth Employment and Reconstruction 
(GEAR)’s market-driven the state intended to secure the support of corporate capital and 
international investors for the creation of an invested ‘prosperity-making bourgeoisie’ 
that would be empowered through the strategy of BEE.
13
 The ANC hoped to secure the 
support of business interests both nationally and internationally as well as political 
support by using BEE to entrench the interests of a small black economic elite rather than 
promoting the interests of the workers. However, in this process BEE was set in conflict 
with its broader objectives of large scale and ‘broad-based’ socio-economic 
transformation.  
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 Morris, M. ‘State, capital and growth: the political economy of the national question’ in Gelb, S. 
(ed), South Africa’s economic crisis, (Cape Town, 1991), p. 35.  
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 Southall, R. ‘The ANC & Black Capitalism in South Africa’, Review of African Political 
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In order to implement this ‘two nation’ strategy, the ANC had to gain the consent of the 
tripartite alliance. The South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) represented the marginalised sector that was to be 
bearing the costs of the strategy. Through a discourse of nationalism and nation-building 
the ANC effected an essentially corporatist strategy moving from the top down to 
promote its neo-liberal growth model.
14
 Corporatism seeks to entrench the interest of 
influential (mostly antagonistic) socio-economic organisations within the prevailing 
economic structure, by granting them participatory powers in return for limited 
bargaining powers. It does this by promoting an ideology of the greater national 
interest.
15
 Since 1995, the ANC has sought a form of social-contract in order to promote 
the over arching interests of neo-liberal growth. However, this legitimation is not a 
resolution to the inherent contradiction within BEE, and the continuation of this tension 
can be seen in many ways. This thesis examines two socio-economic case studies that 
reveal the contradictory nature of BEE policy and the way the ANC uses state power to 
retain its legitimacy.  
 
This thesis is comprised of four main chapters. The first chapter is an examination of 
Afrikaner empowerment. It sketches the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and highlights the 
integral part that economic empowerment played in its development after 1910. In the 
second chapter, Black Economic Empowerment is located within African nationalism 
and its development and growth is tracked within the public and private sector. 
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 Desai, A. & Habib, A. ‘Labour relations in transition: the rise of corporatism in South Africa’s 
automobile industry’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35,3, (September 1997), pp. 495-518. 
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Substantive, but local, micro-studies follow in chapters four and five to ground BEE 
policy in socio-economic realities and examine the complex tensions inherent in its 
reproduction as a strategy for transformation. 
 
An examination of BEE entails an understanding of the recent past and an exploration of 
contemporary history. While most historians shy away from the recent past, Stephen Ellis 
argues that African historians in particular need to take up the challenge of contemporary 
history. Ellis argues that Africa’s post-liberation era, dominated by highly 
institutionalised forms of memory making and the dissemination of national narratives 
deeply rooted in decades of independence struggle, is in dire need of a grounded 
historical perspective. In South Africa in particular, the discipline of historical writing 
can ill afford to be waylaid by the relative ‘recentness’ of its shift to majority rule and 
efforts at democratic consolidation. 
 
As a comparative study between the 1930s and post 1994, the focus on economic 
empowerment presented here is both historical and contemporary. Tracing economic 
nationalism in South Africa within both Afrikaner and African nationalist ideologies, 
historical rooting of the problems and challenges of contemporary society is achieved. As 
Ellis explains, it is ‘precisely the element of chronological depth, in support of an 
analysis of origins and antecedents of the features of the world today, which distinguishes 
the writing of contemporary history from the study of current affairs or from media 
punditry’.
16
 Ellis affirms the importance for contemporary histories to devote particular 
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 Ellis, S. ‘Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa’, The Journal of African History, 43,1, 
(2002), p. 12. 
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attention to ‘structures of political and social organisation and power relationships as they 
appear to today and to extend the starting-point of their data sequences’ back in time.
17
 
Situating Black Economic Empowerment in the broader theoretical framework of 
economic nationalism (and nationalism in general) provides an important context and de-
mythologises to the use of the past as a ‘quasi-mystical force’
18
 from which political 
power is drawn in Pan-Africanist narratives of post-colonial nation making.  
 
Ellis’s view that archival evidence in Africa since the 1970s as likely to be ‘increasingly 
poorly maintained and difficult to use’
19
 possibly carries less weight in South Africa 
where bureaucratic practices are still relatively diligently performed. Contemporary court 
records, no less than those of the past, provide a host of detailed information and 
documentation. Common problems attributed to contemporary history such as the lack of 
archival material and the relevant newness of such material are mitigated in the research 
presented here by the use of court and company documents as a substantive basis for the 
construction of historical narrative.  
 
A comparative perspective on Afrikaner and African nationalisms, and their respective 
economic empowerment strategies reveals interesting parallels, historical continuities, 
and divergences. While the primary emphasis of this thesis is on Black Economic 
Empowerment and the nationalist logics of the ANC, the historical precedent of the 
Afrikaner empowerment approach provides an important point of reference.  
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Chapter I 
Afrikaner Nationalism and ‘bottom-up’ economic empowerment 
This chapter traces the beginnings of Afrikaner empowerment in the Cape and after 1948, 
when the National Party came to power over the entire country. Empowerment policies 
enacted by the National Party, particularly those pertaining to state corporations set the 
structural framework of the economy that the ANC inherited, and within which its 
empowerment policies were located.  
 
The Rise of Afrikaner nationalism and empowerment 
Afrikaner economic empowerment is closely tied with the rise of Afrikaner ethnic 
mobilisation and later nationalism. It is necessary to track both processes as they 
developed throughout the 20
th
 century. Before 1870 the dominant means of economic 
production in South Africa was agriculture. In the British colonies of the Cape and Natal, 
agricultural production was export oriented while in the Boer republics of the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State agriculture was pastoral in nature with surplus earnings extracted 
through the trading of excess yield and the collection of rent from tenants (both African 
peasants and landless whites).
20
 The discovery of precious minerals and the resulting 
boom of the diamond mines at Kimberley, and later the gold mines on the Rand opened 
large new markets for agricultural produce and catalysed capital accumulation through 
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21
 O’Meara, D. Volkskapitalisme, (New York, 1983), p. 23.  
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This process of accumulation was gradual and uneven, and accompanied by tremendous 
social changes, particularly in the Republics. The prevailing system of tenancy among the 
Boer landlords ensured that the means of agricultural commodity production remained in 
the hands of the peasantry, with the landlords mainly extracting rent from tenants. As a 
result the means to capitalise on the growing market surrounding the mines was either 
thought to be less profitable or inaccessible by the agricultural elite that held power in the 
state. Amongst the Boer landlords various struggles occurred between those with smaller 
land holdings and those with large holdings (whom Trapido calls notables
22
). The 
heterogeneous interests represented within this landowner class made the passing of 
major legislation in favour of any particular interest group difficult. It was ultimately the 
Anglo-Boer war and its aftermath which pushed agriculture into capitalist production.  
 
The British scorched-earth policy during the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) destroyed the 
livelihood of many smaller landlords
23
 and together with the recession which followed,  
forced many Boers to move to the growing urban centres surrounding the mines to look 
for employment.
24
 The flow of poor whites into the cities reached 12,000 a year by 
1920
25
 and presented a serious problem for the state as there were insufficient 
employment opportunities. The Carnegie Corporation Commission classified almost 
300,000 urban white Afrikaans speakers as ‘very poor’ in 1932.
26
 While the issue of poor 
whites was not a new one, by early 1920, their number had grown politically volatile. The 
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1922 workers strike is a clear example of political upheaval due to white working class 
discontent. Moreover, the violence with which the strike was stopped indicates that the 
state saw mass mobilisation as dangerous. These developments proved to the government 
that the ‘poor white problem’ was a serious one and elicited early state-directed 
upliftment of poor whites in the form of public works schemes such as at the 
Hartbeespoort Dam.
27
 By 1922 the Hartbeesport Dam irrigation project employed 3400 
white workers, supporting a total community of 10,000.
28
 However, as significant as the 
proletarianisation of Afrikaner Boers was for the growth of Afrikaner politics, many still 
led a rural lifestyle.
29
   
 
The colonial state systematically promoted commercial farming through the 
establishment of land banks and a department of agriculture, the importation of cattle, 
and the provision of ploughing teams.
30
 Only the biggest Boer landlords had the means to 
capitalise on this system, forcing a shift away from rural life for poorer farmers. The 
concessions made to Boers at the end of the Anglo-Boer war and the recognition that 
Afrikaner Boers represented a considerable force in South African agriculture caused the 
colonial state to seek a structural transformation in Boer agriculture towards commercial 
farming rather than its destruction
31
. These state-facilities were not available to African 
peasant farmers and the colonial state became increasingly interventionist in its attempts 
to secure wage labour (constituted of African peasants) to sustain white commercial 
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farming. This trend culminated in the Land Act of 1913, which established the native 
reserve system and the prohibition of African land ownership outside of the reserves.  
 
Political representation of the Afrikaans speaking community reflected differing 
economic classes. The Afrikaner agricultural elite largely supported the Het Volk party 
and cooperated with mining interests due to their beneficial economic relations.
32
 The 
Cape-based Afrikaner Bond, which had Afrikaner support across the classes, joined Het 
Volk and the Oranje Unie party to form the governing South African Party (SAP) at the 
establishment of Union in 1910. While contested internally, the SAP retained relations 
with imperial capital. Disagreement over cooperation with imperial interests ultimately 
led to the splitting of the SAP and the creation of the National Party (NP) under Hertzog 
in 1914. The violent crushing of the worker strike in 1922 in the protection of mining 
interests alienated many supporters of the SAP, shifting them towards nationalist agendas 
as represented by the NP and the Labour Party.
33
 The proletarianisation of Afrikaans-
speaking whites is significant for its polarisation of political support for national and 
imperial interests in South Africa. The workers strike in particular is seen as a significant 
turning point that put the Labour Party/NP coalition into power in 1924.  
 
Early economic empowerment: Mutual aid organisations 
In its early stages, Afrikaner economic empowerment grew out of political forms of 
Afrikaner ethnic solidarity such as the Afrikaner rebellion and its crushing by the colonial 
regime. While eliciting a response of ethnic solidarity from much of the Afrikaans 
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speaking population, it was the politicisation of these events by a Afrikaner elite lobbying 
which promoted nationalism. In the Cape in particular, farmers seeking to promote 
economic solidarity in the face of imperial merchants spawned socio-economic 
cooperative movements such as the HelpmekaarVereeniging (Mutual Aid organisation), 
which sought to mobilise finances for the imprisoned Afrikaner rebellion leaders.
34
 With 
the help of De Burger, the Helpmekaar organisation collected almost £400,000 by 
1917.
35
 Realising the potential for capital accumulation through finance, W.A. Hofmeyer 
(chairman of the Peninsula Mutual Aid organisation) founded the Suid-Afrikaanse 




Santam was founded in December 1917 by a group of six men who met in the Royal 
Hotel in Cape Town. Constituted of prominent Afrikaner political leaders in various 
capacities, this provisional board was concerned with establishing an insurance company. 
Important figures included W.A. Hofmeyer, co-founder of Die Nasionale Pers and 
secretary of the National Party, F.H. Dormehl, executive manager and secretary of Die 
Nasionale Pers, businessmen C.G. Fichardt and A.F. Benning.
37
. The company was thus 
clearly established by an Afrikaner economic and political elite, with Afrikaner interests 
in mind. The committee members were also been actively concerned with the 
‘rehabilitation’ of the Afrikaner Volk and sought to provide a service to the common 
Afrikaner, in particular the struggling Boer farmer.
38
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The Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust- en Assuransie Maatskappy Beperk (Santam) was 
registered on 28 March 1918, and opened its doors on 1 May 1918.
39
 At the first board of 
directors meeting it was decided that Santam would not incorporate life insurance into its 
primary services but rather create a subsidiary, Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewens 
Assuransie Maatskappy Beperk (Sanlam), exclusively concerned with the provision of 
life insurance.
40
 The nature of Sanlam’s capital accumulation was highly dependent on 
the sale of policies, trusts and wills to individuals, particularly rural Boers. Similarly, 
Santam’s extension of micro-credit was also highly focused on agriculture. As a result it 
was important to establish a network of branches. By the end of 1918, Sanlam had 
opened its first branches in Bloemfontein and Morreesburg.
41
 In the same year, Santam 
acquired the African Homes Trust (established in 1898 to primarily provide housing 
loans for low-income groups) for R300,000, outbidding the Johannesburg based 
Schlesinger group by R20,000.
42
 At the end of its first financial year, Sanlam had issued 




Within its first five years, Santam and Sanlam had experienced difficulties due to the 
poor economic climate of the post-war recession and the establishment of the Vrystaatse 
Eksekuteurskamer Beperk (Free-State’s Chamber of Executors) together with the 
Oostelike Vrystaatse Eksekuteurskamer (Orange Free-State’ Chamber of Executors) in 
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 Financially unstable, the Chamber of Executors was ultimately liquidated, 
representing a serious loss of capital for Santam and nearly causing its collapse. 
Surviving this crisis, Santam and Sanlam continued to expand, buying their first building 
in Bloemfontein and establishing services in Natal in 1923.
45
 By 1926, Sanlam had set up 
a branch in Durban and by 1928 it had expanded operations to Windhoek.
46
   
 
The significance of Afrikaner institutions such as Sanlam, and Nasional Pers and the 
individuals closely connected to their creation lies in the small-scale accumulation of 
capital on ethnically Afrikaner lines. The small economic elite of farmers and 
businessmen rallied the support of Afrikaner farmers in demand for protection of their 
interests by the state in the face of changing imperial markets for their products.
47
 The 
division between rural farmers (ethnically mobilised as Afrikaners) and British urban 
merchants was reflected in the financial sector where British banks held the credit for 
rural farmers and were cast in an increasingly discriminatory light when they called in 
debts after the recession in 1880.
48
 As the Afrikaner political elite mobilised ethnic 
support, credit agencies such as Santam and Sanlam allowed for capital accumulation 
through the centralisation of dispersed agricultural savings
49
. They thus not only provided 
basic economic surety but also provided the structure enabling the rise of Afrikaner 
capital (and capitalists) in the Cape. In the Orange Free State and Transvaal, similar 
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financial institutions arose catering for Afrikaner workers. The Suid-Afrikaanse Spaar- en 
Voorskot Bank (Sasbank) and the Afrikaner Verbond Begrafnis Ondernemings Berperk 




The Pact government: State directed development and parastatals 
The Labour Party/NP coalition victory resulting in the Pact government of 1923 was the 
first real opportunity for the white working class and the petty bourgeoisie to enact policy 
towards its economic development. This coalition government required compromises 
from both parties on political direction. Pact policy was contested, constantly shifting and 
often contradictory. The flux created by focusing policy on the needs and wants of 
various classes which stood in conflict with each other over many political and economic 
realities was an important disability of the Pact government. Nevertheless, the Pact 
government implemented the earliest Afrikaner empowerment policies through using the 
capacity of the state. The Pact government specifically promoted economic conditions 
that stimulated the growth of local production and accumulation through industrialisation 
with preferential conditions for local capital. A key mechanism for this process was the 
taxation of mining revenue to fund state-directed development.  
 
The Pact government’s intervention focused around the promotion of local 
industrialisation, the support of commercial agriculture and the protection of said sectors 
from international competition
51
. Protection was provided through the passing of the 
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Customs Tariff Act of 1925 which put tariffs on 28 items previously exempt
52
. Pressure 
from Boers towards greater protection in agriculture saw the beginnings of agricultural 
control boards (which were only passed fully into legislation in 1937) and the greater use 
of land banks and state subsidies to allow for accelerated commercial development in 
agriculture
53
. The Pact government further oversaw the establishment of the first state 
corporations, notably the state-owned industrial catalyst, Iron and Steel Corporation 






While conditions for the accumulation of national (and Afrikaner) capital were improved 
in many ways (and unexpectedly restricted in others), conditions for white workers did 
not improve drastically. Wage levels between 1922 and 1934 stayed relatively constant 
and well below pre-1922 wages
56
. This is unsurprising given the Pact government’s 
reliance on mining (by far the biggest employer) for revenue. In contrast the state acted 
decisively to alleviate the problem of poor unemployed whites. The ‘civilised labour’ 
policies were enacted through the creation of the Wage Board under the Wage Act of 
1925 which implemented minimum wages for white labourers and created incentives for 




                                                 
52
 Davies, Kaplan, Morris, & O’Meara, ‘Class struggle and the periodisation of the state in South 
Africa’, p. 9.  
53
 Fine, B. & Rustomjee, Z. The Political Economy of South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1996), p. 128. 
54
 Legislation for the creation of Eskom was already passed in 1922, but its realisation took time. 
55
 Smuts had long sought to create a local Steel producer, but was reluctant to use state funding. 
Clark, N. L. Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa, (New Haven, 1994), p. 60. 
Davies, Kaplan, Morris & O’Meara, ‘Class struggle and the periodisation of the state in South Africa’, p. 
10.  
56
 Davies, Kaplan, Morris & O’Meara, ‘Class struggle and the periodisation of the state in South 
Africa’, p. 11.  
57
 Ibid, p. 12.  
 26 
Pact policies enabled the upliftment of select groups amongst Afrikaner workers, but the 
poor white problem persisted and worsened with the Great Depression. As a result, the 
Pact government’s impact is most commonly discerned as a period of rapid acceleration 
of the economy’s industrialisation process that began during the First World War 
accompanied by support for the accumulation of national capital. National capital, 
however, did not equate to Afrikaner capital and while Afrikaans speakers increasingly 
swelled the numbers of the urban poor and unemployed during this period, Afrikaners’ 
share in the capital accumulation process was still very limited. By 1938 Afrikaners 
owned only five percent of the economy’s total non-agricultural production
58
 while 
producing 87 percent of agricultural output
59
. Furthermore, of the non-agricultural 
production, most was indirectly or directly linked to the agricultural sector. As a result, 
Afrikaner capital accumulation was still firmly based within rural agriculture, a sector 
notoriously temperamental and unsuited to rapid accumulation.  
 
The United Party’s coming to power in 1934 radicalised Afrikaner political opinion and 
accelerated Afrikaner cultural politics. With Afrikaner political power weak in 
parliament, Afrikaner political leadership’s concerns were shifted towards extra-
parliamentary entities, especially the Afrikaner Broederbond, who took up the role with 
vigour
60
. The Bond recognised that to mobilise mass national support, the appeal of a 
cultural movement was insufficient and it needed to address the economic difficulties 
faced by its Afrikaner constituency. Between 1930 and 1939, the Bond had increasingly 
concerned itself with the economic plight of the Afrikaner Volk and its empowerment. 
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One of the most important milestones until the 1939 economic congress was the 
establishment of Volkskas.  
 
Volkskas: A Broederbond creation 
Volkskas was not the first cooperative bank set up to cater for an Afrikaner client base, 
but it was the first one started with Broederbond finances and supported on a cultural-
political scale. Founded in 1918 as the Jong Zuid Afrika, the Broederbond (since 1920) 
was an organisation dedicated to the promotion of Afrikaner cultural and political 
interest. As a true ‘Afrikaner’ organisation, the Broederbond sought to mobilise 
Afrikanerdom and the rise of Afrikaners within society. Their involvement in the 
promotion of Afrikaner capital was a direct response of this cultural-political aim. 
Afrikaner cooperative banks arose in the late 1910s and early 1920s and provided credit 
for people who were not deemed creditworthy by commercial banks, and their interest 
rates were only a quarter of that charged by money-lenders.
61
 The first of the Afrikaner 
cooperative banks was the Ons Eerste Volksbank which was founded out of the 
Armblanke Verbond in 1917.
62
 The Verbond was an organisation that facilitated 
employment seeking and provided small-scale credit and pension facilities. Ons Eerste 
Volksbank was started with the money put forward by 50 people (amounting to R 500) 
and no dividends were paid out.
63
 By the end of 1926, the bank had 3,098 members and 
accumulated fixed deposits of R 55,080 with capital reserves of R 15,174.
64
 Ons Eerste 
Volksbank was succeeded by two independent cooperative banks; the Afrikaans Verbond 
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Spaar en Vorskotkas Beperk, founded in Bloemfontein in 1918 and the Voorskotkas van 




The idea of an Afrikaner Bank was conceived by the Broederbond at its economic 
congress in 1931 and its concern over foreign capital’s ‘stranglehold’ over commercial 
banks.
66
 Lead by J.J. Bosman, the Broederbond’s treasurer (who would continue to 
spearhead the Volkskas venture and be its first general manager), a committee was 
established in December that year to investigate the viability of and the necessary 
structures for, an Afrikaner bank.
67
 The committee brought a proposal before the 
Broederbond’s Executive Council and the Volkskas Koöperatief Beperk, founded on 3 




Volkskas was conceived as a financial institution in support of the upliftment of the 
Afrikaner Volk. Its creation and running was intertwined with the Volkspaarbeweging 
(Volk’s Savings Movement) and facilitated the spiritual and economic upliftment of the 
Afrikaner people by breaking the financial constraints imposed upon them.
69
 The bank 
would actively involve itself in the promotion of a mentality of saving and cooperative 
investment while stimulating economic solidarity within the Afrikaner people.
70
 Founded 
on cooperative principles, it was envisaged that Volkskas would transform into a 
commercial bank once it had accumulated the necessary capital reserves and 
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accompanying capitalist mentality among Afrikaners.
71
 This way the consolidation and 
growth of Afrikaner capital would allow for greater economic control for the Afrikaner 
Volk in the face of existing (foreign owned) banking giants such as Standard Bank and 
Barclays.  
 
J.J. Bosman as a member of the Broederbond was also instrumental in the establishment 
of Uniewinkels Koöperatief Beperk, a cooperatively based chain of Uniewinkels (union 
stores), in 1936.
72
 These general stores provided Afrikaners with everyday supplies as 
well as credit facilities. Uniewinkels received strong support from both J.J.Bosman (who 
was general manager of Volkskas as well as director of Uniewinkels), and Volkskas, who 
often provided financial support to Uniewinkels in its early years.
73
 Beginning with a 
share capital of R1934, Uniewinkels experienced many difficulties early on, but with the 
help of Volkskas managed to procure a second store in Bloemfontein in 1937. 
Uniewinkels was designated as the official supplier of memorabilia at the Voortrekker 
Eufees in 1938, despite it lacking the capacity to do so.
74
 Uniewinkels advertised itself 
with the slogan ‘In diens van ons volk’ (in the service of our volk), emphasising its 




An integral part of the Afrikaner culture as promoted and propagated by Afrikaner 
cultural organisations is a strong Calvinist religious belief. This religious doctrinal infusal 
of Afrikaner culture created a strong Calvinist work ethic through its interaction ‘with the 
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contingencies of daily life’ (what Stokes calls ‘operant religion’).
76
 This work ethic 
promoted hard, honest work with spiritual devotion and acted as a framing ideology in 
Afrikaner secular life. Due to the largely homogenous nature of Afrikaner ethnicity, this 
Calvinist ideology promoted the development and empowerment (in all aspects of life) of 
the Afrikaner people.  
 
Because of its ideologically charged origins, Volkskas was heavily imbued with the 
language of Afrikanerdom. As its official slogan it adopted Arbeidsaamheid (diligence) 
and it regularly portrayed itself as ‘uit die volk, vir die volk’ (born of the people, for the 
people) or ‘die volk se bank’
77
. The bank further involved itself in Afrikaner cultural 
festivals and projects. At the Voortrekker Eufees in December 1938 in Pretoria (when the 
cornerstone of the Voortrekker Monument was laid), Volkskas had its own stall 
recruiting customers from the stream of Afrikaners attending. The Afrikaner identity of 
the bank and the fact that it made itself available to the public in such a setting was well 
received. The bank was urged to open branches by many visitors from smaller towns 
throughout South Africa.
78
 Volkskas also made funding available so that visitors could 
prolong their stay at the festival. Volkskas had a stall once again at the six-day inaugural 
festival of the Voortrekker Monument in December 1949. Thereafter Volkskas attended 
and contributed to the Van Riebeeks Festival and Show in Cape Town in 1952 by 
opening a stall run by the Cape Town branch of Volkskas. In Johannesburg too, the bank 
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celebrated the ‘300 years of progress’
79
 by building a float portraying President Kruger 
(played by J.A. Hurter, director of the Johannesburg branch) and his wife receiving 




Volkskas positioned itself ideologically as an Afriknaer institution. It played a central 
role within Afrikanerdom and put forward its economic function as serving the Afrikaner 
Volk and its development. Attributable both to its Broederbond connections and to its 
self-proclaimed desire to create an economic awareness amongst Afrikaners, this 
politicisation served to facilitate the consolidation of Afrikaner capital within the 
financial sector.  
 
Due to the Depression, the small-scale credit and saving facilities provided by Volkskas 
had a great impact and were readily taken up. On its first day of operation, Volkskas 
accumulated R44 in deposited savings, and R1500 in fixed deposits while extending 
credit of R1534.
81
 Five months later savings had grown to R3794, fixed deposits to 
R17,880 and credit to R23,583.
82
 The bank used a vigorous advertising campaign based 
on its Afrikaner heritage and small-scale cooperative status to recruit a large client base. 
Not everyone viewed the rise of Volkskas amicably, however. Existing commercial 
banks felt that Volkskas was operating outside of its legal mandate as a cooperative bank, 
while other cooperative banks (such as Sasbank) attacked it for propagating imperialist 
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 Nevertheless, with the backing of the Broederbond, Volkskas continued to 
win support and expand its Afrikaner client base. In September and October 1936, J.J. 
Bosman (general manager of Volkskas), accompanied by prominent Broederbond 
secretary I.M. Lombard, travelled around the country to gather capital and mobilise 
support. Intensified advertising via pamphlets and newspaper advertisements supported 
this personal journey. Within these two months, Volkskas managed to boost its number 
of shareholders by 712 to a total of 2109.
84
 Volkskas continued to draw support and 
expand its operations, and by 1941, deposited savings amounted to R470,000, fixed 




As Volkskas grew, its interest turned towards establishing itself as a commercial bank. In 
the first five years of its existence, it established itself as a valuable client for the 
commercial banks (particularly Standard Bank) due to its own banking needs.
86
 However 
when it was granted commercial bank status on 13 July 1940, its threat as a competitor 
became all too clear. As a result, Standard Bank, Barclays and Nederlandsche Bank 
refused to recognise and transact with Volkskas as a fully established commercial bank. 
The three banks intermittently refused to cash in Volkskas cheques, and levied bank 
charges of up to 800% more on transactions with the bank than they did on transactions 
amongst themselves.
87
 It was only by 1947, after years of negotiations, that the last issues 
were resolved among the commercial banks.
88
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A significant aspect of Volkskas’s expansion, particularly for a relatively small, non-
commercial bank, is how rapidly it extended a network of branches across the country. 
The first branch was opened in Johannesburg in August 1935, and a second branch in 
Benoni established in October.
89
 In 1937, branches were established in East-London, 
Durban and Cape Town. By the time Volkskas was granted commercial status, it had 
established 17 branches and by 1952, it had branch offices in 92 locations.
90
 
As such, the expansion pattern is indicative of the grassroots (often rural) Afrikaner client 
base, while foreign-owned banks, which serviced large (often mine-related) industries, 
were concentrated in the main economic centres of South Africa.   
 
While the rapid growth of Volkskas was extraordinary (its capital reserves accumulated 
by a yearly average of 41.92 percent
91
) considering its humble origins, it was not a threat 
to foreign capital as represented by commercial banks, except for the fact that it held a 
large percentage of the Afrikaner demographic. By 1947, Volkskas still only held 3.25 
percent (R25,491,668) of all commercial banks’ total deposits (R784,272,000)
92
, 13.06 
percent (R4,140,720) of all savings accounts (R31,704,000)
93
, and 2.16 percent 
(R14,549,542) of all current accounts (R674,888,000)
94
. However it did provide an 
important foothold for Afrikaner capital in South Africa’s financial world. Volkskas 
provided micro-finance for poor Afrikaners and allowed for the expansion of Afrikaner 
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businesses. Furthermore, its ideological mission allowed it to make decisions based not 
only on commercial success (shown by its relationship with Uniewinkels), but on long-
term support for Afrikaner business.  
 
Volkskas exemplifies the grass-roots empowerment effected by the Broederbond under 
the banner of Afrikaner nationalism. Broederbond support stemmed from a real concern 
for the plight of the Afrikaans-speaking white’s economic position as well as a 
recognition that nationalism was empty without the provision of real socio-economic 
changes for the Afrikaner. This co-mingling of political interests with the concern for 
socio-economic welfare for the Afrikaner people culminated in the ideology of ‘kultuur-
politiek (cultural politics)’.
95
 Propagated through Broederbond political and cultural 
associations, ‘kultuur-politiek’ promoted Afrikanerdom and promulgated the 
entrenchment of Afrikaner heritage and its rightful place within the socio-economic 
fabric of South Africa. The result was the promotion of Afrikaner interests within a 
framework of Afrikaner nationalism which carried cultural, political, economic and social 
aspects and destined the Afrikaner Volk for independence.  
 
Acting through its public Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereenigings (FAK), the Bond 
hosted the Ekonomiese Volkskongres in October 1939. Initially intended to deal with the 
poor white problem, the congress’s central problem became the Afrikaner’s economic 
position and ‘how to transform it’
96
. Under the concept of Volkskapitalisme, the 
development of the Afrikaner’s role in the economy was to be effected through the direct 
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‘transformation of [Afrikaner] economic consciousness’
97
 and the pooling of capital 
resources scattered across the Afrikaner Volk. To this end the Bond established a 
comprehensive organisational structure through which the economic life of the Afrikaner 
could be transformed, and established credit institutions for the accumulation of 
Afrikaner capital such as the Federal Volksbelegging (FVB).
98
 The Economiese 
Volkskongres was an important step for Afrikaner economic empowerment through 
political mobilisation. It was further pivotal in the shifting of Afrikaner nationalism 
towards the early stages of a nation-building process.  
 
National Party in power: Apartheid as Afrikaner economic empowerment 
Coming to power in 1948, the National Party’s empowerment of Afrikaners could take 
place within the sphere of state power and from the top-down as opposed to the grass-
roots methods of empowerment that it effected under a nationalist banner. Putting into 
practice the Apartheid programme with which the National Party campaigned, South 
Africa was effectively restructured into multiple ethnic nation-states with a privileged 
position for whites. The reproduction of the privileged position of whites and the lifting 
of Afrikaners into positions of power was effected through a comprehensive strategy 
operating on various levels. The National Party guaranteed support of Afrikaner capital 
within industry through the active involvement of state corporations within the country’s 
economy. It also controlled wage levels for both white and African labour to secure 
large-scale employment for whites. It also implemented a distributional regime with 
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welfare policies that privileged whites and neglected Africans, and restructured the 
education system along ethnic lines in order to promote the education of Afrikaners.  
 
Espousing a policy of Import-Substitution Industrialisation
99
, the state under Prime 
Minister Verwoerd assumed a protectionist stance designed to promote local 
industrialisation through the erection of tariff barriers and strong state involvement 
through its parastatal institutions. Supplementing Iskor, Eskom and the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC)
100
 with further strategically important institutions such 
as Sasol, Foskor and Krygkor, the state extended its control over industrial development. 
Collaborating with establish mining capital like Anglo-American, the corporations 
entrenched the interests of both Afrikaner capital (looking to grow within the economy) 
and largely foreign mining capital. Collaboration and the use of state resources allowed 
for the rapid consolidation of Afrikaner capital within the mining industry allowing 
further promotion of Afrikaner business interests in the industrial sector.  
 
Coupled with the state corporations’ involvement in every industry, the state 
implemented labour policies that supported Afrikaner and mining capital by providing 
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large amounts of cheap African labour, while securing skilled employment for whites.
101
 
Employment was based on the civilised labour policies begun under Pact government 
which structured wage levels around ethnicity. Regulating labour supply through the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1953 (barring Africans from being classified as employees) 
and the Urban Areas Act of 1952 (controlling the movement of Africans within urban 





Under the National Party, welfare policies were deeply skewed to privilege whites in 
order to alleviate the conditions for poor whites (primarily Afrikaners). These policies 
were coupled with efforts to effect the long-term empowerment of Afrikaners through the  
development and promotion of education amongst Afrikaner whites. This distributional 
regime was enabled by the high international demand for South African resources and 
manufactures in the post-war boom era coupled with the racially exclusive economic 
policies that allowed the state to cut spending on African welfare and concentrate it on 




Described as a racially exclusive form of developmentalism with strong bureaucratic 
authoritarianism
104
 the National Party’s system of welfare relied on the reversal of 
African unemployment security in the form of the Unemployment Insurance Amendment 
                                                 
101
 Seekings, J & Nattrass, N. Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa, (New Haven, 2005), p. 
137. 
102
 Seekings, & Nattrass, Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa, p. 141. 
103




Act, requiring much higher income rates for Africans to qualify.
105
 Coupled with the 
lowered wage rates under Apartheid labour policies this guaranteed minimum pay-outs of 
benefits to African labour. African pensions were also reduced and held steady, resulting 
in the stagnation of pension rates to Africans, while white pensions doubled in real value 
during the 1950s and 1960s.
106
 Spending on African school feeding schemes was reduced 




As a central pillar of Afrikaner empowerment, education received a tremendous amount 
of attentions from the state. Taking control of the education system nationwide (in 
contrast to health care where it increasingly passed the responsibility to the private 
sector) it boosted state-spending on education, both African and white. While white 
education did receive more funding on aggregate than its African counterpart,
108
 the state 
did not cut funding for ‘Bantu education’ due to its importance in securing a functional 
labour base (of various skill and literacy levels) for Apartheid’s industrial needs.
109
 
Development of white education was especially important to the National Party in order 
to reproduce the privileged position of the Afrikaner, while ‘Bantu education’ 
simultaneously reproduced an unskilled labour force that would not be in competition 
within the labour market. Rising Afrikaner education levels matched those of English 
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speakers by the 1970s and Afrikaner representation in tertiary education increased 





Afrikaner economic empowerment was a halting and uneven process both temporally and 
geographically. Beginning largely in the Cape with the protection of farmer’s economic 
interests, economic empowerment progressed slowly through the ever-greater 
propagation of ethnic (Afrikaner) sentiment by political actors seeking class mobilisation. 
With empowerment efforts grass-roots in nature, the foundation of large scale Afrikaner 
economic empowerment was slowly established. Lead by the Broederbond, the Afrikaner 
nationalist agenda was promoted heavily until the National Party’s coming to power in 
1948, which enabled Afrikaner economic empowerment to take on a top-down state 
driven dimension with deep and far-reaching consequences for the structure of the 
economic and social fabric in South Africa. Significantly, the distinguishing features of 
Afrikaner economic empowerment were established prior to 1948. The links between the 
powerful secret organisation of the Broederbond, Volkskas, savings cooperatives and 
Afrikaner cultural organisations formed a web of connections held together by a powerful 
ideological commitment centred on a Calvinist work ethic.  
 
Importantly, Afrikaner empowerment was an organic development from grass-roots 
origins. Promoted by cultural and political organisations, Afrikaner economic nationalism 
had established a firm base upon the entrance of Afrikaner political power into 
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government. This is a key aspect of its empowerment successes, for it allowed the 
National Party to combine state-directed empowerment to draw on strong and deeply 
routed Afrikaner business interests in the private sector. It was the cooperation between 
private and public Afrikaner enterprise that was crucial to its success in effecting 












Black Economic Empowerment: The development of a concept 
This chapter sets out the ANC’s ideological framework of transformation and nation 
building and locates Black Economic Empowerment in this context. The structural 
inequalities and distortions of the socio-economic fabric that the ANC inherited presented 
it with the profound challenges of transformation and wealth redistribution. Attempting to 
map out issues of transformation, equality and redress, the ANC drew on 
multidimensional (mostly contradictory) discourses of deep social transformation and 
orthodox neo-liberal economic policy (with emphasis on fiscal restraint), the tensions of 
which they were never able to resolve. The periodic surfacing of these tensions forced the 
ANC government to re-evaluate policy structures and enter into participatory processes in 
order to garner the support of powerful groups for Black Economic Empowerment as a 
transformative tool.   
The beginnings of Black Economic Empowerment 
In the 1960s, the growing Black Consciousness movement developing in the political 
vacuum of the banned black political parties (such as the ANC and PAC) was paralleled 
in business by the establishment of black business associations in order to oppose 
restrictive legislation under Apartheid and promote blacks’ entry into business. The 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc), established in 




 Opposing the host of discriminatory legislation
112
 it sought to negotiate 
better business opportunities for blacks with the Apartheid government and private 
sector, particularly within the retail sector as it represented the biggest concentration of 
black business. The unyielding Apartheid legislative framework restricted black business 
to the Bantustans and economic opportunities in urban white areas were opened to Indian, 
Asian and Coloured business people in 1962 within limits (that they did not represent 
competition to white business).
113
  
The emerging Black Consciousness movement in the 1960s gave rise to prominent black 
business leaders like Nthato Motlana
114
, a medical doctor who had established a practice 
in Soweto and became an important community leader in the 1970s. After various 
unsuccessful business ventures, Motlana established the first black owned clinic (Lesedi 
Clinic) in the country in 1978.
115
 He was also the founder of Sizwe Medical Aid, a 
medical aid scheme for blacks with a membership of 80,000.
116
 Motlana went on to co-
found the Get Ahead Foundation (an association targeting unemployment through the 
informal sector) in 1984 and the National Association of Cooperative Societies of 
Southern Africa (Naccsa), which included a host of stokvels, burial societies and 
women’s clubs in 1990.
117
 In 1994 Motlana’s New Africa Investments Limited (a BEE 
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investment company) was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and well on its 
way to being one of the biggest BEE companies in South Africa. 
By the late 1970s, the Apartheid state had become increasingly militarised and increased 
its stranglehold on all spheres of black economic and social life.
118
 Nafcoc established the 
African Bank in 1976 in order to provide finance to black businesses that would have 
difficulty procuring funding from established white-owned banks.
119
 In order to address 
the skills shortage experienced by black entrepreneurs and businessmen and women, 
Nafcoc established the Masekela-Mavimbela Memorial Scholarship Fund in 1976.
120
 
Receiving contributions from every Nafcoc member the fund allowed for the financing of 
tertiary education for many of its members as well as offering short-term business 
management courses. 
After 1976, white business called for the promotion of a black middle class to counter the 
influence of radical anti-Apartheid movements in South Africa. The Apartheid state 
attempted to use the Bantu Investment Corporation (in existence but neglect since 1958) 
to facilitate the development of black business in the Bantustans.
121
 Within the 
Bantustans, the creation of development corporations were aimed at facilitating a rise in 
middle class Africans. White business’ initiative was in the creation of the Urban 
Foundation and the Small Business Development Corporation, both aimed at the 
development of black business.
122
 By the 1980s, the decades of sanctions had taken their 
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toll on the Apartheid economy. White business had expanded to its limits, and, prevented 
from expanding internationally due to sanctions, sought access to the largely untapped 
black consumer power in South Africa. As a result, black business found less resistance 
from the white establishment and frameworks of cooperation seemed more lucrative. 
New black business associations included the Foundation for African Business and 
Consumer Services (Fabcos), established in 1989, which sought to promote black 
economic empowerment through funding and the secondment of skilled staff from 
established white business in order to promote the skilling of black businessmen.
123
 A 
result of this new found cooperation between Fabcos and white business saw Shell SA 
provide staff to assist the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association in management 
structuring.
124
 Fabcos also facilitated joint ventures between the formal sector and black 
business, the most prominent example being the creation of Future Bank in a joint project 
between Fabcos and Wesbank in 1991.
125
 Future Bank aimed at providing finance to the 
informal sector, capitalising on established financial institutions’ unwillingness to enter 
into that market. In its agreement with Wesbank, Future Bank received training from its 




At a Nafcoc conference in October 1990, its members set out its vision for accelerated 
black economic empowerment with particular emphasis on self-reliance, black 
managerial integration in the formal sector, greater black ownership in the formal sector, 
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greater black involvement in manufacturing and improved black management training.
127
 
Proposed ways of achieving this vision included employee share-ownership plans 
(Esops), negotiations with the Chamber of Business, improved education and the setting 
up of leadership centers.
128
 
By the 1990s the Apartheid economy was in decline. Focused around a Minerals and 
Energy Complex (MIC) the economy in the 1990s was highly inefficient, sectorally 
imbalanced and largely reliant on state economic activity and resources. The protective 
import-substitution policy employed by the Apartheid government coupled with the 
prevention of upward mobility for the overwhelming majority of the workforce had left 
limited opportunities for sustainable growth.
129
 The economy was highly dependent on 
the exploitation of cheap black labour to retain profitability and lagged behind in 
technological innovation.
130
 Years of neglect meant that the workforce lacked the skills 
needed for technological advancement. Global factors such as the rapid decline in gold 
prices and oil-crisis driven recessions in the late 1980s only exacerbated the drain on state 
resources.
 131
 Structurally, the economy was dominated by a handful of large 
conglomerates and closely connected parastatal companies. While the parastatals 
represented a vitally important vector for transformation, both in their scale as employers 
and in their link to the private sector as suppliers of services and consumers of resources. 
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While the ANC was highly aware of this fact, it was not decided on how to make use of 
this catalyst most efficiently.  
The negotiated transition and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 presented challenges 
for the ANC’s agenda. During its struggle years, the ANC’s socio-economic goals had 
been directed by the Freedom Charter’s broadly redistributive principle with a strong 
emphasis on equality and state provision of basic needs. Based on these ideas, the ANC 
expected to nationalise large sectors of the economy and provide widespread land 
redistribution on coming to power. While the concept of Black Economic Empowerment 
had solid foundations within black business organisations and black business leaders’ 
promotion of black advancement within the economy along capitalist lines, these 
concepts were not readily accepted by the ANC, whose focus under Mandela’s leadership 
was on negotiating the transition, national reconciliation and political stability.
132
 Due to 
its socialist struggle background, the ANC was furthermore reluctant to embrace business 
as a sphere of transformation.
133
 Here it stood apart from established black business 
leaders and activists who were often vilified as having bought into white capitalist ways 
of life and becoming ‘errand boys’ of white business and the Apartheid state.
134
  
The negotiated settlement under the two Conventions for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) and the later Multiparty Negotiation Forum (MPNF) particularly with its 
‘sunset clause’ of an interim transitional government set the structures within which the 
ANC could effect transformation. In particular the wide-scale guarantee of property 
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rights negotiated by the exiting National Party, only secured the fading of broadly 
redistributive ideas within the ANC. As a result, the turn towards capitalist ideas of 
transformation took greater root in the mid 1990s and lead to the uneven entrance of 
Black Economic Empowerment into state policy. At the ANC’s National Conference at 
Mafikeng in 1997, the ruling party ‘endorse[d] the idea of a black capitalist class’
135
 in 
empowering the ‘black community in general and the African people in particular’.
136
 
The development of Black Economic Empowerment as a state policy occurred within this 
contested environment of broader economic policy for South Africa and as such 
represented a contradictory process that attempted to reconcile the socio-economic 
specificity of Apartheid’s legacy with the accelerating global economic ideology of neo-
liberalism, while simultaneously attempting to negotiate the state’s role within an 
unstable political economy. 
Policy ideas based on liberal capitalist economics started to gather much weight among 
prominent ANC economists such as Trevor Manuel and Alec Erwin. This coupled a 
realisation that ‘the rising black bourgeoisie and middle strata […were…] important 
motive forces for transformation’.
137
 After its coming to power in 1994, the ANC has 
repeatedly negotiated tensions in its transformation of the economy. The formulation of 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994 represented a strong 
shift away from the nationalist rhetoric propagated by the Freedom Charter and elicited 
strong resistance from the ANC’s coalition partners, the SACP and particularly 
COSATU, who opposed any shift towards laissez faire economic policy that might be to 
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the detriment to its union members’ interests.
138
 COSATU’s resistance, while grounded 
ideologically in their support for nationalisation, was also concerned with the structure of 
a neo-liberal South African economy:  
‘The goals of the Reconstruction & Development Programme will be defeated if 




However, by 1996, the ANC had pushed through its new economic agenda and drawn up 
the neo-liberal Growth Employment and Reconstruction (GEAR) policy programme.
140
 
GEAR espoused a greater reliance on ‘market mechanisms, […] maintenance of fiscal 
and monetary policy restraint; and opening up of the economy to international 
competitive forces’.
141
 The state further sought to introduce efficiency and 
competitiveness within the economy through the implementation of laws and institutions 
that limited monopolisation and encouraged competition. The Competition Act of 1998 
that established the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal sought to 
enforce a new framework for ensuring competitiveness.
142
 This ideological shift from 
nationalist economic policy towards free-market ideas represented a victory of ‘centrist’ 
economic thinkers within the coalition such as then deputy president Thabo Mbeki, 
Trevor Manuel and Alec Erwin.
143
 Importantly, this shift not only represented a change in 
policy formulation within the ANC, but the passing of GEAR into legislation represented 
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a victory for the ANC over its two tripartite allies, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
144
 The shift was at 
least partly informed by South Africa’s desire to return to the world market and privatise 
Apartheid’s large parastatals.  
Black Economic Empowerment with the framework of the ANC’s Growth Employment 
and Reconstruction (GEAR) was based on this liberal economic thought and was 
inherently contradictory due to its attempts to address the structural inequities within the 
economy via transformation within those same structures. The ANC recognised the 
dominance of liberal economic thought in the global economy after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as a fundamental factor of the international system of trade it was hoping to 
enter into.
145
 With the major remaining socialist economic role models spearheading their 
own forms of capitalism in the East, the ANC had to reconsider its long-standing policy 
of nationalisation for a more market-oriented approach. As a result, the ANC also looked 
to international models and transformative precedents. One particularly striking model 
was the Malaysian experience of economic empowerment, which lent itself well towards 
deriving applicable lessons for South Africa’s efforts at transformation. 
Malaysia’s society in the late 1950s had deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic 
lines, with the indigenous Bumiputra (Malay) majority living in large-scale rural 
underdevelopment while most of the economy was under the ownership of Indian and 
Chinese minority ethnic groups. As a result, the post-independence government 
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 Majority Bumiputra nationalist political power (in the form of the 
United Malays National Organisation)
147
 had reach to reach a political compromise with 
the political representation of the Indian and Chinese economic power (the Malaysian 
Indian Congress and Malaysian Chinese Association respectively).
148
 The result was a 
political ruling alliance by the three parties held together by the Communities Liaison 
Committee (CLC), a forum in which a process termed ‘elite accommodation’ is given 
space. ‘Elite accommodation’ allowed for ‘leaders of the racial groups [… to decide…] 
policy away from public bargaining’
149
, and allowed the various parties to make 
concessions in order to secure political power and constitutional representation (in the 
case of the Bumiputra) and continued economic freedom (in the case of the Chinese and 
Indian ethnic groups).  
 
However, transformation of society was extremely slow, and the socio-economic 
conditions of the Bumiputra showed little improvement while the Chinese and Indian 
ethnic groups experienced increased prosperity. As a result the elite accommodation 
alliance was strongly challenged in the 1969 where it lost its two-thirds majority (but not 
political power) and the outbreak of violent and bloody riots for two months thereafter 
made clear that the racial accommodation system was extremely fragile and more had to 
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be done towards the transformation of Malaysian society.
150
 As a result the New 
Economic Plan (NEP) took on a much stronger transformative aspect after 1970, putting 
emphasis on ‘the promotion of national unity through greater emphasis on social 
integration and more equitable distribution of income and opportunities’.
151
 The state had 
an active role in attempting to develop rural areas, raising income levels, raising 
education levels and employment. Promoting economic growth
152
 through liberal 
economic policy and securing foreign investment
153
 (a lot of which stemmed from 
Chinese sources) was paramount and a primary vehicle for effecting the above 
transformations.  
 
While the success of the Malaysian model as to all its objectives is debatable, its elite 
accommodation and stronger NEP have managed to create a relatively stable society 
through the creation of a large Bumiputra middle class which served to stabilise racial 
accommodation between previously socio-economically disparate ethnic groups. As a 
result the Malaysian economic empowerment experience at least offered a lesson of 
‘pragmatism and common sense’.
154
 While it is unclear how much of the Malaysian 
experience was assimilated in the ANC’s BEE policies, it is clear that the ANC was well 
aware of its possible relevance.  
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With a broader ideology of transformation in mind, the ANC recognised that the state 
sector was the space in which the fastest and most fundamental changes towards 
transformation could be achieved. Reflecting ideas of the open market, the government 
sought to implement large-scale privatisation (partial privatisation allowing private equity 
buy-in as well as full privatisation) within the state economic institutions in an effort to 
introduce efficiency and profitability while simultaneously generating a space for black 
enterprise to enter into the formal economy. The ANC’s drive for privatisation was to 
prove its commitment to the open market and reassure international investors as well as 
established national capital that the economy was stable and the prospects of growth, 
strong. 
In the period of transition, four parastatal giants dominated the state sector: Denel, 
Transnet, Telkom and Eskom. At the core of Apartheid state’s influence over the 
economy, these parastatals were the primary targets of privatisation under the ANC. A 
two pronged strategy of privatisation and ‘employment equity’ sought to sell off non-core 
assets and transfer production to the private sector. An ethnic transformation of the state 
workforce would allow greater black representation.
155
 The aim of privatisation of non-
core state assets was to introduce efficiency and profitability within the state sector, the 
unbundling of the economy’s dependencies on state resources, and make space for black 
private enterprise to enter the economy. The selling off of non-core state activities would 
provide a capital injection from equity buy-ins, provided an important source of revenue 
for debt reduction under the restrained fiscal policies.  
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The first move towards privatisation came in 1990 under the Apartheid government when 
it announced that the National Sorghum Breweries were to be privatised in 1991 to black 
capital with share capital underpinned by the Industrial Development Corporation.
156
 By 
1993 NSB was the largest black owned company in South Africa and seen as the perfect 
example of the privatisation of state assets to effect transformation of the economy and 
shift wealth into black hands.
157
 Practicing affirmative action, 70% of NBS’ board of 
directors and 83% of its top management was African, with 90% of its shareholders 
coming from African communities.
158
 However NSB’s success was short lived under 
years of mismanagement and corruption. Coupled with the company’s inherited 
overcapacity and underwhelming sales brought NSB into financial trouble by the end of 
1993.
159
 Acquiring new stakeholders in 1996 in the form of United Breweries
160
 (an 
Indian brewing company) did little to stem its recording of annual losses blamed on rising 
disposable income in African communities and the shift in drinking preferences that 
accompanied it.
161
 NSB was ultimately bought out by South African Breweries in a deal 
restructured by the Competition Commission in 2000 to give NSB a five year grace 
period in which to become profitable.
162
 
During this early privatisation phase (1997-2000), the government sold off South African 
Broadcasting Corporations (SABC) for R510 million to private business in 1997 and 
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partially privatised Telkom, selling a 30 percent stake to private investors.
163
 Within two 
years a 20 percent stake in South African Airways was sold to Swissair for R14 billion 
while a Transnet subsidiary, Connex Travel was sold for R13.5 billion and the Airports 
Company of South Africa (ACSA) was sold off to a mix of foreign and local capital.
164
 
As a result of privatisation between 1997 and 2004, the state received capital revenue of 
R28.7 billion, R12 billion of which was used to reduce national debt.
165
 Throughout, 
preferential treatment was to be given to black enterprise, that is, an empowerment stake 
was to be set aside. However privatisation as a vehicle for BEE achieved only limited 
success. Telkom’s ten percent empowerment stake was never fully realised and was 
dwarfed by the stake acquired by Telkom Malaysia and American-based SBC. Black 
business’s procured stake of 4.9 percent in ACSA similarly paled compared to the 20 
percent bought by Aeroporti di Roma, and fell far short of the intended 10 percent 
empowerment share. While black business did secure some important deals such as a 30 
percent stake in Transnet’s Viamex Fleet Solutions, overall the rapid privatisation 
achieved limited transfer towards black empowerment and largely benefited foreign 
capital. Furthermore, the almost wholesale selling off of state assets to foreign capital and 
the continued political opposition to this trend particularly from COSATU, forced the 
ANC to re-evaluate privatisation as a tool towards transformation. This led to greater 
recognition of the capacity of the state sector to serve as a catalyst for transformation. 
This recognition culminated in the new policy document
166
 which argued for the state to 
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play a much stronger role in the development of the economy using in particular the vast 
resource that are the parastatals. 
While privatisation was intended to streamline the state sector on a broader level, within 
the parastatals themselves, the focus lay on profitability and employment equity. These 
goals were themselves contradictory. The largest four parastatals in the state sector, 
which provided over 94 percent of its net income
167
 all attempted to become profitable 
and the measures they adopted were to down-scale its workforce to achieve greater 
efficiency in core production, and used revenue from the selling off of non-core assets to 
offset the costs of restructuring and running debts.
168
 The obvious consequence was that 
the reduced workforce had a more limited ability to instate employment equity. Transnet 
cut employment by 50,000
169
 while Denel cut its workforce by 10,000
170
 to reduce 
operating costs and limit net losses. Both parastatals were further burdened by large 
debts, with Transnet in particular (the largest of the four parastatals) having accumulated 
a massive debt of ten billion rand in its pension fund that it was simply unable to 
reduce.
171
 Even after the management of the pension fund was handed over to private 
investment companies, Transnet continued to fluctuate between losses and narrow profits. 
Perhaps the best example of the difficulties experienced in the restructuring and 
privatisation of the parastatals is the case of South Africa’s arms industry lead by Denel.  
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Problems of restructuring: The case of Denel 
Arising in the 1960s under Verwoerd’s policy of self-sufficieny in the face of increasing 
UN sanctions, Armscor
172
 quickly became the parastatal head of a large South African 
arms industry catering primarily to the needs of South Africa’s ever growing military 
needs. The slow warming of the Cold War in the late 1980s had a significant impact on 
the world arms market. The effect was especially dramatic on the South African arms 
industry and particularly Armscor, after the de Klerk government’s policy shift towards 
demilitarisation in 1989/1990. Concretely, the scaling down of the arms race meant that 
the international arms industry underwent extensive restructuring to the effect that the 
largest corporations bought out the smaller ones that found it difficult to secure business 
in the post Cold War era, ultimately resulting in a concentration of the international arms 
industry. From 1990 to 2005 the five largest arms manufacturers internationally increased 
their share of the top 100 arms manufacturers’ total arms sales output by 10 percent, from 
33 to 43 percent.
173
 Of these top five, only one arms manufacturer, British Aerospace 
Systems (BAE) is not based in the United States.
174
  
It was in this changing economic environment that the South African arms industry 
needed to compete in order to ensure its survival as an industry. As South Africa entered 
the transition period, the Defence Budget experienced large cuts by the NP government 
as it sought to weaken the military power to be handed over to a black government. The 
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NP initiated the cessation of active military involvement in the region and cut defence 
spending.
175
 The combination of these elements dealt a considerable blow to the South 
African arms industry, forcing cutbacks within the industry and the retrenchment of 
skilled workers, causing various domestic industries linked to arms development and 
production to down-size or exit the arms industry.
176
 This reduced defence spending and 
policy of disarmament continued throughout the transition period with a profound effect 
on skilled (white) labour. Employment within the arms industry declined ‘by over 90 000 
between 1989 and 1995, including over 10 000 in the public sector’.
177
 Taking into 
consideration that some towns such as Simon’s Town were exclusively dependant on the 
defence industry due to the presence of military bases and arms manufacturing plants, 
this decline of the arms industry had a significant impact on local and regional 
economies. Furthermore, it is important to note that the impact of declining employment 
was regionally specific and not uniformly spread across the nation, creating regional 
economic and political destabilisation.
178
  
The actual privatisation process of Armscor began with the National Party, and ended 
under the direction of the ANC government. The result saw Armscor was stripped of all 
its manufacturing subsidiary companies, leaving it as a state board controlling the supply 
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 The manufacturing 
subsidiary companies were merged under the name Denel, and privatised in April 1992, 
although the state retained majority share, effectively owning the company
181
. Some 
whites were outraged, calling the entire process a farce and claiming that white voters 
were tricked into voting pro-reform on the referendum of 1992 under the impression that 
Armscor would be substantially privatised, and not kept in government hands. This 
development, the Patriot (a right wing Afrikaans newspaper) claimed, put the white 
skilled labour force under substantial risk of losing their employment.
182
 Nevertheless, 
the process of privatisation and the unbundling of these conglomerates was an important 
step in the ANC government’s plans of economic restructuring and served multiple 
purposes. The conglomerates needed to be broken up, not only because they were archaic 
white power structures, but also because they represented an interconnected web of 
protected inefficiencies.  
Once Denel was created in 1992 through the merger of the various manufacturing and 
research subsidiaries previously under Armscor, it was confronted with the difficult task 
of internal restructuring. With the ANC’s restructuring and dissolution of much of the 
SANDF, including large cuts to the defence budget,
183
 Denel lost a large part of its 
primary (internal) market. It was also not possible for Denel to simply sell its products on 
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the international arms market due to its convoluted and inefficient corporate structure, 
highly localised products and the fact that some inherited facilities were commercially 
unviable.
184
 In light of this, Denel took corporate restructuring measures, reorganising 
itself into ‘five industrial groups - Systems, Manufacturing, Aerospace, Informatics and 
Properties, and Engineering Services’.
185
 Furthermore, Denel attempted to change its 
production methods to more marketable ones through strategies of conversion and 
diversification.
186
 Some industries decided on the conversion route and switched 
production modes in order to produce civilian products that could be sold on both 
international and domestic civilian markets. A prime example of this was the military 
satellite and missile launch system manufacturer Houwteq, and its conversion strategy as 
it turned to producing low-earth orbit civilian satellites after 1992.
187
  
Others attempted to use diversification to tap into the same civilian markets for 
technology products. Companies that used this approach include missile and air defence 
systems manufacturer Kentron, electro-optical equipment producer Eloptro and rifle and 
shotgun manufacturer Musgrave. Kentron diversified to include production of traffic 
engineering systems and plastic glass-fibre products, while Eloptro began producing 
glass-moulding and night vision equipment for civilian purposes and Musgrave 
diversified to add production of cricket bats and motor vehicle parts.
188
 Overall, Research 
& Development generally concentrated on the development of civil sector technology or 
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converting military technology for civilian business purposes, while diversifying military 
production to increase marketability both foreign and domestic.
189
  
However, despite restructuring towards better marketability, Denel experienced deep 
financial problems. While Denel managed to increase civilian sales by 40 percent 
between 1992 and 1995, overall the parastatal was still posting annual losses.
190
 Denel’s 
management structures were slow to adapt to a competitive market after prolonged 
operation in a protective domestic market. The process of adapting to a new, 
commercially competitive role was difficult and cumbersome. Furthermore, various 
companies that had a role to play in the domestic arms market and Armscor’s protected 
structure were simply not commercially viable on the open market. As a result, Denel 
needed to resort to the selling off of businesses, cost cutting and the retrenchment of 
employees.
191
 Externally, Denel had to compete with the many foreign arms industries 
that had consolidated themselves into a few enormous conglomerates after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the resulting downturn in global arms markets following the end of 
the arms race.
192
 Furthermore, Denel was slowed down by the government’s lack of a 
clear policy directive concerning the domestic arms industry in South Africa.
193
 Denel 
continued to post annual losses, only posting a profit in 1997 and 2001. This alarming 
trend came to a head with a recapitalisation of Denel by the state under Finance Minister 
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Trevor Manuel to the amount of R2bn in 2006
194
 after recording a loss of R1.6bn. 
According to Denel’s annual report, the record loss of R1.6bn in 2005 occurred due to the 
‘failure to achieve sales target, increase in provision in contract losses and adverse impact 
of the exchange rate’.
195
 The R2bn capital injection had some asking why it was 
necessary to invest so much capital in order to keep a foundering industry afloat.
196
  
A primary obstacle for the successful internal restructuring of the parastatals such as 
Denel was the conflict in the competing goals of restructuring: profitability and equitable 
employment. As seen in the case of Transnet, moves towards profitability were not 
necessarily reconcilable with efforts for equitable employment and even less with the 
broader ideology of creating equitable economic conditions. With the state unwilling to 
shoulder the financial burden of commercialisation, it came down to the employees 
having to absorb the cost cutting necessary for profitability through downsizing and 
retrenchment. It was for this same reason that COSATU was continually in opposition to 
privatisation, even after securing a compromise to make the process more consultative.
197
  
Between 1995 and 2000 the biggest step towards transformation came perhaps not from 
the state, but from the private sector and the listing of major South African assurance 
companies on the Johannesburg Stock exchange as shareholding entities. The 
demutualisation of Sanlam and Old Mutual in 1998 and 1999 respectively into a publicly 
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listed company unlocked billions of Rand to the South African public through the 
issuance of shares to its policy holders and to the open market. Predicted at the time to 
unlock around R15 billion into the economy over two years,
198
 the listings represented 
the redistribution of wealth from the heights of South African business to the middle and 
lower income classes.
199
 While this was not an altruistic endeavour since the listed 
companies gained tremendous value by being listed, particularly with the newly passed 
legislation allowing the listing of South African companies on foreign stock exchanges, 
the demutualisation of companies like Old Mutual and Sanlam represented major 
transformative shifts in the economy.
200
 
A shift to stronger state-policies of BEE 
Early efforts at privatisation demonstrated the difficulties in securing a black 
empowerment share and avoiding the selling off of assets to foreign interests. 
Furthermore they highlighted the contradictory processes of the transformation of the 
economy on a broader scale and the internal restructuring of the parastatals (particularly 
in the case of employment equity). Of greatest concern to the ANC government was the 
dismal performance of its parastatals even though they were largely successful in 
transforming their workforce to be more equitable. Repeated losses by Denel, Transnet 
and Telkom did not produce investor confidence or reassure the private sector that the 
state would provide an economic environment for growth. While control of the state 
sector allowed for important inroads into the economy for black business through 
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preferential procurement, these were insufficient for a comprehensive restructuring of the 
economy. Most importantly however, the ANC’s BEE strategy had little impact on the 
private sector dominated by white owned enterprise. The ANC’s reliance on market 
mechanisms to produce growth and economic opportunities for black business did little to 
dilute white capital’s control over the private sector due to the reproduction of racial 
inequalities within the economy’s structure.  
When a number of leading political figures, including Cyril Ramaphosa (Secretary 
General of the ANC), Tokyo Sexwale (Premier of Gauteng) and Saki Macozoma (ANC 
Member of Parliament), resigned from their posts in political office in 1997 and took up 
business ventures in the private sector, the BEE policy came under criticism and elicited 
calls for more active state involvement in determining empowerment policy within the 
private sector.
201
 Recognising that a change in policy was needed, the Black Business 
Council set up the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC) in 1997 and 
tasked it with investigating BEE policy and propose changes towards its future. The 
BEEC’s report presented in 2001 proposed greater and more focussed state intervention 
for the creation of an enabling environment for black business, including the passing into 
law of transformation guidelines and targets.
202
 Specifically the report called for a Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, clearly setting out a comprehensive policy of BEE with 
legislative transformation targets for the private sector. The report further proposed the 
establishment of an Investment for Growth Accord, National Empowerment Funding 
Agency and an Empowerment Framework for Public Sector Restructuring to facilitate the 
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transfer of public and private assets to black enterprise as well as the creation of 
entrepreneurial black business.
203
 While the ANC viewed these recommendations with 
some misgiving, particularly with regard to their potential to scare-off foreign 
investment, the suggested shift towards stronger state involvement in the implementation 
of BEE within the private sector seemed a necessary transition from its market-reliant 
BEE policy.  
 
In December 2002, at the 51
st
 National Conference, the ANC adopted the BEEC’s 
proposal in principle, and drew up a transformation charter setting out timelines and 
legislative proposals and guidelines for the implementation of a comprehensive BEE 
policy. In a much stronger financial position due to the years of fiscal policy restraint, the 
ANC committed to greater state intervention in the economy and stricter policy 
formulation and enforcement for the broader transformation of the economy. The policy 
framework culminated in the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act which 
was passed in 2003. This act sets out the state’s vision for Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) as:  
‘An integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly 
contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about 
significant increases in the number of black people that manage, own and 
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Upon the release of the BBBEE transformation charter, the private sector responded to 
the government’s proposed aims for transformation by attempting to largely pre-empt 
state legislation towards black economic empowerment within the private sector by 
drawing up their own charters. These charters intended to provide a mechanism for 
private business to show willingness to cooperate with the state’s goals of transformation 
and attempt to pre-empt potentially harmful dictated terms. While such chartered 
cooperation required concessions from established business, failure to respond to black 
economic empowerment was a greater potential risk. Such pro-active cooperation further 
allowed private enterprise to negotiate the process of economic empowerment and allow 
its own needs to be recognised. The charter movement was ultimately an expression of 
private enterprise’s recognition of the political requirements of economic change and the 
realities of operating in such an environment.  
Drawing up a charter for transformation in 2002, the liquid fuels sector was the first to 
adopt a framework for the transfer of ownership and equity into black hands. All the 
companies signing the charter committed to the transfer of 25 percent of its equity by 
2010.
205
 In the mining sector, the leaked government proposal that set transformation 
ownership targets at 51 percent within ten years caused an uproar among mining 
companies and a sharp fall in investor confidence, wiping R11 million off the major 
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mining companies’ share prices in 2002.
206
 After lengthy negotiations with government, 
the mining sector agreed on a milder charter which set the ownership target at 26 percent 
over ten years but required a 40 percent representation at managerial level within five 
years. The mining charter also introduced a scorecard approach to transformation targets 
which included criteria such as black representation at all levels, worker development, 
housing and community development.
207
 A watershed initiative form the privates sector 
(called the Brenthurst Initiative) was revealed by De Beers in 2003 and was particularly 
influential in proposing a scorecard approach to performance and linking these to tax 
incentives. It further proposed the establishment of empowerment funds in the form of 
employee share options and increased pension fund investments by private business.
208
 
While the ANC rejected this proposal overall, and in particular the creation of tax 
incentives, it did reduce tax disincentives in relation to BEE performance in the following 
year. It also introduced tax exemption for employment share schemes in 2004.
209
   
Other economic sectors followed the liquid fuels sector, adopting the scorecard approach 
and releasing their own charters. The financial services industry entered into negotiations 
with the DTI in 2003. A contested equity transfer target of 25 percent by 2010 was 
ultimately approved, however this only required ten percent direct ownership and ten 
percent through indirect control such as pension schemes.
210
 Further terms included 
representative targets at all levels, procurement expenditure of 50 percent to black 
companies, the allocation of empowerment financing and social responsibility 
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 Health care, maritime and information and technology sectors followed in 
late 2003 and 2004 with BEE charters. As a result, transformation charters became the 
primary vehicle through which BEE policy was enacted and promoted. It must be noted 
however, that not all industries have issued transformation charters, with the brewing 
industry, dominated by economic giant South African Breweries, being a notable 
exception.  
Private sector engagement in perspective 
Due to the active involvement of private enterprise in the transformation of South African 
business, the envisioning of Black Economic Empowerment as a state driven project in 
the face of antagonistic private business was to be re-evaluated. Interesting parallels exist 
between corporatist strategies within labour markets of industrial sectors and the pre-
emptive nature of the charter movements. The corporatist nature of the negotiation 
process that entrenched essentially antagonistic interests in a framework of participatory 
cooperation can be discerned in the charter movement.
212
 However, this partnership 
between business and the state was significantly consolidating the power of dominant 
political and economic forces to the exclusion of large sectors of the population 
represented in particular by COSATU and the SACP. As a national liberation movement 
coming to power under a banner of the Freedom Charter which emphasised equal rights 
and wealth for all, and promoting a policy of redress and economic transformation for 
broad-based wealth, the ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment policy ultimately sought 
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to secure the support of politically and economically important elites, exacerbating the 
marginalisation of the lower classes. The ANC was unable to resolve the underlying 
tensions between its broader aims of transformation and wealth creation (of which 
BBBEE is seen as a vital instrument), and the consolidation of black capital creation 
within elites through its BEE policies. When confronted with the contradictions, 
legitimacy was sought through corporatist strategies of participatory inclusion or the 
blunt use of political power.  
The linkages between the ANC and private black enterprise are well developed due to the 
crossing over of political figures into business in the late 1990s as well as through the 
preferential procurement policies extended towards private business by the state sector. In 
the consideration of procurement deals and the tendering of contracts in general, 
preference was to be given to black owned companies. While this elicited criticism from 
entrenched suppliers to parastatals early on, preferential procurement was nevertheless an 
important tool for the restructuring of business networks to represent more equitable 
conditions and allow for black enterprise to break into previously excluded sectors of the 
economy. This process was not without its problems however. While it led to the 
concentration of black enterprise within the space created around state enterprise (as was 
intended by the ANC), it also represented a dependency on the state. Furthermore, the 
aegis of preferential procurement did not necessarily encourage the establishment of 
sustainable enterprise, but rather exploitative short-term business. These linkages 
together with the state’s increased involvement in promoting BEE within the private 
sector since 2003 have led to accusations of cronyism from the liberal media.  
 69 
Conclusion 
The ANC was faced with numerous challenges in its nation-building process. The 
negotiated nature of the transition set the terms for its restructuring of the economy while 
international acceptance of neo-liberalism in the face of the fall of the Soviet Union 
forced it to further reconsider principally distributive policies as reflected in the RDP 
programme. Focusing its Black Economic Empowerment within and through the state 
sector, the ANC achieved limited success and was forced to adopt a much more 
interventionist approach to BEE within the private sector where it was largely pre-empted 
into participatory processes with industry through the charter movement. While its goals 
of diluting white capital’s hold over the private sector were largely effective, its 
establishment of a wealth-creating black business elite raised tensions between its aim of 
redress and broader transformation of the economy, and the needs of the poor. The 
implementation of BEE established the state as a site of economic activity through which 
BEE could be enforced through preferential procurement and tendering along 
economically empowered criteria. However, this has also entrenched linkages between 
black business and the state, reinforcing empowered business’s dependency on the state. 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment was thus largely focused on the upper strata 
of economic activity, promoting the interests of the black business elite over those of the 






Confronting the structuring of an industry 
 
While most of the literature on Black Economic Empowerment focuses on the big BEE 
deals as in the mining industry, very little has been written about the effect of BEE on a 
micro-level. In order for such an examination to be successful however it requires a 
suitable entry-point. There is perhaps no better field for this purpose than the gaming 
industry. Legalised outside of the homelands under the ANC government, the gaming 
industry was very clearly structured with the aim of producing wealth and the 
redistribution thereof. This incredibly lucrative industry making yearly profits in the 
billions not only provided ample opportunity for taxation, but also profitable 
opportunities for black business to buy into and for general wealth distribution via 
preferential shares to Historically Disadvantaged Persons (HDP). Furthermore, the 
legalisation of the gaming industry provided opportunity for linkages with other 
industries and the creation of small and medium enterprises, further sustaining growth 
and continued redistribution. Localised in the Western Cape, this chapter examines the 
gaming industry and its structure and, in particular, the company Intshinga Holdings 
Limited (IHL). Intshinga Holdings is particularly instructive for it is an example of so 
many Black Economic Empowerment holding companies that constitute the broad base 
of the wealth pyramid in the gaming industry and the ones to which the redistribution is 
intended to ‘trickle-down’ to.  
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The gaming industry illustrates the problems with state-directed Black Economic 
Empowerment legislation as a tool for the transfer of wealth. While BEE legislation 
within gambling sets up complex empowerment requirements in terms of equity 
ownership and preferential share options to poor communities (its primary vehicle for 
comprehensive wealth redistribution to the poor), it neglects to put into place 
accountability structures and relies on pre-existing legislation for the enforcement of 
good conduct and corporate governance within these investment holding companies. The 
Intshinga case shows how the locking up of share value within investment holding 
companies (via un-tradeable shares) benefits only the operating ventures at the top of the 
constructed capital pyramid, while providing marginal benefit to the individual share 
holder, and in particular poor communities involved in these empowerment ventures.    
 
Intshinga Holdings Limited is a black empowered public holding company situated in the 
Western Cape. Founded in 1994 as a private investment company (Intshinga Investment 
Ltd) by Julian Ross, it was incorporated as a public investment holding company in 
1997.
213
 IHL’s starting capital was R10,000 issued in 1 million shares of R0.01 each.
214
 
As an empowered company, its self-stated aim is to serve as a ‘vehicle through which 
Historically Disadvantaged Persons (HDP) could participate in the growth of the gaming 
and hospitality industry in South Africa’.
215
 To that end the company, as a founding 
partner, acquired a 3.74 percent stake in Grand Parade Investments as its primary 
investment in 1998. In 1999 it diversified and procured a 0.48 percent stake in Zama 
Resources Corporation, an empowerment consortium with investment interests in various 
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resources including coal, forestry, oil & gas and others. In 2001, IHL further acquired a 
0.10 percent stake in UniPalm, an empowerment group with interests in 
telecommunications and energy.  
 
As an empowered investment holding company, Intshinga was established in the Western 
Cape gaming sector after gaming was legalised and licensed in 1996. Incorporated as a 
public company in 1997, IHL grew steadily through the return on its investments in 
Grand Parade Investments (GPI) and it appeared to have a solid future as an 
empowerment investment company, creating wealth for its shareholders. By 2009, 
however, IHL was essentially dissolved, deregistered and all its shares unbundled so that 
shareholders would hold GPI shares directly. With a Board of Directors featuring some 
prominent political figures, attorneys and adept businessmen, IHL’s dissolution is a 
remarkable development. The story of Intshinga Holdings Limited reveals deep inherent 
problems with the Black Economic Empowerment legislation at company level that 
inhibit real transfer of wealth and do not foster long-term, productive capital that 
promotes growth and development.  
 
In the Apartheid era, gambling was only permitted in the homelands where it was 
dominated by Sun International. At the transition to majority rule, Apartheid gambling 
legislation was still in effect. Allowing gambling establishments only in the homelands, 
and under strict licensing, the Apartheid government received a welcome stream of 
revenue from the heavily taxed gambling industry monopolised by Sun International. The 
ANC announced its new National Gambling Bill in the mid 1990s, allowing gaming 
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establishments in previously inaccessible areas. South Africa’s demand for gambling was 
estimated to be worth between two- and three billion Rand, and government’s total 
license allotment of 40, required comprehensive restructuring from Sun International’s 
South African business.
216
 Consolidating the distributed shares held by the previous 
homeland development corporations (still held by provincial governments) into Sunbop 
shares, Sunbop was transformed into Sun International South Africa (SISA).
217
 Since the 
government’s National Gambling Bill placed great importance on Black Economic 
Empowerment on multiple levels, SISA needed empowerment partners within each 
province to be able to tender for a gambling license.  
 
Through negotiations with black investors, Grand Parade Investments Limited (GPI) and 
AfriSun Leisure Investments Limited (AfriSun) were created and incorporated in 1997 as 
empowerment stakeholders in SISA’s Western Cape subsidiary Sun West International 
Limited. Both GPI and AfriSun were 51 percent black owned through the creation of 
share vehicles that established two classes of shares; ordinary shares (‘O’ shares) and low 
voting shares (‘N’ shares), the ordinary shares representing lower funding, but greater 
voting representation than the ‘N’ shares.
218
 As a result, black economic representation 
within SunWest International amounted to 51 percent. In its empowerment bid, SISA 
further stood as surety for empowerment partners’ share loans and held large numbers of 
‘N’ shares in reserve for its empowerment shareholders that could gradually be procured 
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to increase their capital involvement.
219
 In 1999, SunWest’s tender was successful and it 
received a license to operate in the Western Cape area focussing on the Grand West 
Casino and Entertainment World. Sun West International’s second large investment 
interest came to fruition in the Table Bay Hotel in the Victoria & Alfred Waterfront.  
 
Grand Parade Investment as the bigger empowerment partner within Sun West held an 
effective voting stake of 34 percent, while Afrisun Leisure Investments held a 17 percent 
stake. In 2001, the preferential share offer to previously disadvantaged persons raised 
capital for GPI to acquire an 8.53 percent capital stake in Sun West.
220
 By June 2003, 
GPI had increased its economic stake in Sun West to 20 percent.
221
 Grand Parade 
Investments further holds a 5.67 percent stake in National Casino Resort Manco Limited, 
which holds 50 percent of the casino management contracts nationally, as well as a 50 




As stipulated in the gambling legislation, separate management companies, to which the 
casinos pay fees based on revenue and on profit, were required to manage the licensed 
casinos.
223
 With a mandatory 50 percent to be owned by black empowerment 
shareholders, the management companies were to pay its shareholders dividends. 
National Casino Resort Manco Limited’s Western Cape Casino Resort Manco Limited 
held the management contract for Sun West’s Grand West Casino and Entertainment 
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World. Intshinga Holdings Limited (IHL) was invested primarily in Grand Parade 
Investments with limited other investments in its portfolio. As a result it was firmly 
entrenched in the success of GPI and the Western Cape gaming industry in general.   
 
In 2002, Intshinga Holdings Limited increased its issued share capital to R100,000 by 9 
million shares of R0.01 each, and provided a private offer to existing shareholders at 400 
cents per ordinary share with a minimum subscription of 1000 shares and a maximum of 
500,000 shares.
224
 The very fact of IHL’s empowerment status and share provision to 
previously disadvantaged persons meant that while many of the shareholders benefited 
form the offer, it inevitably lead to the concentration of ownership amongst those who 
had the biggest capital resources available to them, excluding most importantly, the 
previously disadvantaged persons. After the share issuance, Intshinga Holdings Limited 
had 150 shareholders, with majority ownership falling to a few individuals mostly on the 
Board of Directors. Chairman, Alexander Abercrombie held 28.86 percent. Founder and 
managing director Julian Ross owned 19.28 percent of IHL shares. Director Mphathi 
Nyewe, held 20.4 percent of IHL shares. Another notable shareholder was Khoi-Qwa 
Fishing Development Company at 9.5 percent ownership. These four shareholders held a 
78 percent stake in the company, the remaining mainly black, shareholders constituting 
the last 22 percent.
225
 This concentration of voting control in the hands of a few 
individuals (who are also on the Board) had a significant impact on the running of the 
company and the representation of shareholder’s interests.  
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As Intshinga’s investment value increased with the value of Grand Parade Investment’s, 
the board of directors entered into an escalating power struggle over direction and 
essentially control over the company. The personalised conflicts are an expression of the 
director’s increased representation of personal interests rather than the effective running 
of an investment holding company for the benefit of all shareholders towards continued 
growth. Between 2002 and 2003, IHL did not hold any Annual General Meetings, or 
published any interim or annual financial reports to its shareholders, despite these being 
statutory procedure dictated by the Companies Act.
226
 Alexander Abercrombie, a notable 
attorney must have been keenly aware of the requirements of directors stipulated in the 
Companies Act, and thus the above omissions seem particularly self-interested and 
represent deliberate neglect of the interests of IHL.
227
 In 2006, ‘in lieu of the loyalty of 
the directors to the Company and, particularly, the formation and enhancement thereof’ 
the directors sought the granting 150,000 share options to them at three Rand per share at 
the Annual General Meeting.
228
 The resolution was approved together with another that 
authorised the directors to develop and propose an executive share option plan for the 
directors based on each year of completed service on the board of directors as well as 
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When director Danny Jordaan resigned in June 2006 due to increased pressures of work 
as the CEO of the South African Football Association (SAFA), he was not replaced and 
the number of directors fell down to four, concentrating board control even further and 
increasing tensions between the remaining members over investment decisions. Board 
decisions seemed to be split between Julian Ross and Mphathi Nyewe on the one side, 
and Alexander Abercrombie and Charles MacDonald on the other. On 17 September 
2007, MacDonald proposed a special resolution for consideration at the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) on 12 October 2007 to have both Ross and Nyewe removed as directors, 




Ross applied for an interdict preventing his own and Nyewe’s removal as directors, 
claiming misconduct, breaches of company law and intent to take control of IHL for 
MacDonald’s own purposes.
231
 Ross argued that the resolutions for the removal of Ross 
and Nyewe were in breach of statutory procedure under the Companies Act for they were 
issued by MacDonald alone, whose percentage of shares held at two percent was 
insufficient (5 percent is required) to requisition the company to circulate his proposed 
resolution. Ross further disputed the timeousness of the proposal as it was lodged only 32 




Ross’s affidavit describes Abercrombie’s dubious intention of pledging all of Intshinga’s 
shares in Grand Parade Investments in return for a two million Rand bank loan without 
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shareholder or board approval.
233
 It further describes Abercrombie’s efforts in October 
2006 to get the board to sign a voting pool agreement with other GPI shareholders, a 
request that was opposed by Ross and Nyewe. Ross’s discovery of the fact that 
Abercrombie nevertheless signed the voting pool agreement on behalf of IHL in 
December 2006 caused the issue to be raised at the following board meeting in January 
2007, during which Abercrombie with support of MacDonald disputed the accuracy of 
the pervious meeting’s minutes, claiming that the agreement was ratified by the board.
234
 
Ross’s suspicion of Abercrombie’s intentions was heightened when he discovered that 
Abercrombie had appointed himself as Company Secretary without board discussion or 
approval.  
 
At the board meeting on 22 August 2007, Ross and Nyewe raised their concerns over 
MacDonald’s suitability as a director and expressed their reservations over his possible 
re-election at the next AGM. Once again, Ross and Nyewe were at loggerheads with 
Abercrombie and MacDonald over the direction of the company. Nevertheless, they 
agreed that the board should increase to five members once again, and that nominations 
would be considered from both sides. Subsequently, a dispute arose surrounding the 
nominees, Abercrombie claiming Ross’s nominees were provided after the cut-off date. 
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Since 2003, Grand Parade Investments showed excellent growth, raising its economic 
stake in Sun West in 2007 to 26.41 percent, with an increase in share value by over 600 
percent. Most significantly, GPI listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 6 June 
2008 under ‘General Finance’, allowing its shares to be traded at market values. Upon 
GPI’s listing in 2008, Intshinga Investment Holdings’ directors proposed the unbundling 
of all IHL shares into direct Grand Parade Investment shares, unlocking value for 
shareholders due to the tradeable nature of GPI shares as well as its increased value upon 
listing. The unbundling would essentially dissolve IHL as the GPI shares held would be 
distributed directly to IHL shareholders. Approved at a Special General Meeting on 18 
September 2009, the unbundling procedure was implemented after 9 October 2009. 
 
The board of directors of Intshinga Holdings Limited was clearly in contravention of the 
Companies Act on numerous occasions, most particularly in their neglect to issue and 
make available to shareholders, interim and annual financial statements for IHL, as is 
required by law. As the directors had intimate knowledge of the Companies Act, such 
contravention is deliberate and self-interested. While the director’s followed due process 
diligently within its first years of operation, once their control of the company was 
concentrated via the issuance of nine million further shares, their neglect in performing 
the functions for the continued operations of IHL coupled with personal conflicts 
between directors led to escalating tensions. The continued power struggle between 
directors over the control of the company marginalised the smaller shareholders whose 
interests ceased to be looked after due to the errant running of the company. It further 
stagnated any growth Insthinga could experience due to the lack of any decisive growth 
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direction the company was taking. The ex-directors continue to be prominent figures in 
political and business circles, with Abercrombie in particular becoming a non-executive 
director of Grand Parade Investments, a director at Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr attorneys and 
being appointed a judge of the High Court of South Africa.  
 
As this chapter illustrates, the gaming industry in the Western Cape as elsewhere in the 
country, is by legislation and by disparate economic resources, a complex web of 
business ventures and capital investments. BEE legislation forced SISA to create 
businesses at various tiers with subsidised empowerment partners due to the limited 
capital resources available to, and small size of, the black business community. The 
structure is a lucrative investment for all parties involved and the industry remains stable 
although with relatively limited long term growth through diversification (due to the 
limited amount of licenses), providing for a solid vehicle for economic empowerment and 
transformation. This is particularly the case with the many possibilities for empowerment 
capital to increase its economic stake within the companies through reserved shares and 
various financing options made available directly and indirectly by SISA. Heavily taxed, 
the industry also provides substantial revenue for government. In its own terms, the 
empowerment structure within the Western Cape gaming industry seems successful, and 
it has indeed led to vast accumulation of wealth for some invested entities. However, as 
the case of Intshinga Holdings Limited reveals, capital accumulation stays largely near 
the top of the structure and does not necessarily penetrate down to the black investor with 
limited capital resources.   
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While the gaming industry has shown remarkable stability and produced impressive 
revenue at the top, capital-intensive tier, the wealth distribution process as envisaged by 
government has severe limitations when viewed at a micro level. Due to the structure of 
BEE within the gaming industry, previously disadvantaged persons only have viable 
access to the wealth creation process through the buying of shares in public investment 
holding companies such as Intshinga. However, due to the unlisted nature of such 
companies and their investment holdings, the value of shares is determined with 
difficulty. Furthermore, as the shares are not tradeable, their value is essentially locked, 
and thus represents unproductive capital. While the value of shares might rise 
significantly, in order to unlock the value held, the company needs to either list on 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, or resort to mechanisms such as unbundling – like 
Intshinga chose to do. However, the process of unbundling essentially dissolves the 
investment holding company, preventing any further growth. As a result, the investment 
holding company is not a sustainable growth vehicle that promotes the development and 
diversification of black business or deepens the penetration of black capital within 
existing business structures.  
 
The history of Intshinga reveals the limits of BEE legislation at a micro level. While the 
law dictates terms on a broader level that appear to promote transformation, the 
government’s structures for checking accountability do not go beyond the level of the 
National Gambling Board’s audit of licensed gambling operators. Government relies on 
the Companies Act to guide the governance of BEE investment holding companies such 
as IHL. Without the proper accountability structures however, the task falls to the 
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shareholder to hold the company to account with regard to abuses and misconduct. This 
can involve expensive and lengthy legal action. Those investors making use of special 























The case of a poor rural community up against a broad based BEE 
company 
 
The second case is one that exemplifies the contradictory nature of BEE policy in 
attempting to affect transformation and wealth redistribution through orthodox liberal 
economic policy. As BEE companies win procurement tenders from the state, they often 
come into conflict with communities who ultimately become disadvantaged due to the 
state’s support of BEE policy against the interest of previously disadvantaged poor 
communities, which are ultimately the intended beneficiaries of transformation. Within 
the Western Cape the two prominent cases are the state’s support of BEE interests to the  
detriment of the community in the Richtersveld
236
 and the here discussed case of 
Maccsand’s sand mining activities to the detriment of a community’s restitution claim.  
Communities disadvantaged by BEE policy have been described as BEE’s ‘powder 
keg’
237
 for good reason. These conflicts
238
 are important for an analysis of BEE for they 
provide insight to the state’s own perceived role and support of particular interests and 
the public legal battles that these cases showcase provide legal precedent for future 
determinations. Moreover, the state’s support of particular interests in these cases not 
only puts it in contradictory positions pertaining transformation and BEE, but also 
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national political power against provincial political power, with the state’s tendency for 
top-down ruling from national heights becoming increasingly clear.   
 
The case of Macassar centres on a yet unresolved legal battle between representatives of 
the Macassar (previously Sandvlei) community and a Black Economic Empowerment 
company, Maccsand. The complexities of the drawn-out court proceedings hide deep 
tensions between community and state, and political contradictions within the ANC 
government itself. Black Economic Empowerment, while not visibly central to the 
Macassar issue, is at the centre of the dispute over land and mineral rights at Macassar. 
The case is discussed in some detail in this chapter as it highlights the complex legal 
process involved in making way for BEE on the one hand and the insecurity of poor 
communities’ claim to land restitution, on the other. In this instance the BEE initiative 
depended on the negation of a subsistence community’s rights to land. On the face of it, 
the BEE company operating in the Macassar area was a model. 
 
In 1997, the Darries Group,
239
 consisting largely of Darries family members from the 
Sandvlei community, officially incorporated Maccsand as a close corporation with Black 
Economic Empowerment status. Its membership of previously disadvantaged individuals 
was over 85% and over 50% of the business ownership was constituted of three members 
of the Darries family, F. Darries, Y. Darries, and M.G. Darries.
240
 Operations were 
further run by M.G. Darries in the positions of ‘Management, Marketing & Securing 
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Contracts’ and F. Darries as the head of ‘Mining Operations’.
241
 The Department of 
Minerals and Energy Affairs granted Maccsand’s mining license on 6 January 2001, 




Maccsand sought to mine sand on a piece of land (erf 1197) in Macassar that was also the 
subject of a land restitution claim by a subsistence farming community which has resided 
there since the 1860s. The land in question is the property of the state, but, with respect to 
the BEE initiative, different legal and administrative jurisdictions seem to be in conflict 
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Map 1. The Western Cape Peninsula  
 
 
Map 2. The Macassar Area and Erf 1197 
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The Macassar community 
The greater Macassar area is located in the Western Cape along the Eerste River and is 
one of historical and environmental significance. The presence of the Eerste River and 
the Macasser dunes makes the area environmentally unique and the location of a Kramat 
is of heritage significance to the South African Islamic community.  
 
The land under claim from the Macassar community (Erf 1197) is designated as a part of 
the commonage constituted of various Erven – including 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1991 
and 544 Macassar. The history of this piece of land is intertwined with that of 
Apartheid’s expropriation of land under the Group Areas Act. The official existence of 
the community’s commonage was removed from records in the course of implementing 
this act. The post-Apartheid government’s efforts at restitution allowed for the 
community to lay claim to the lost commonage in the mid 1990s.  
 
What is now known as Erf 1197 was part of the land purchased by Pieter Laurens Cloete 
on 22 July 1831 and registered under the name Zandvliet.
243
 In 1862 Cloete created a 
series of lots (lots 25 to 63) along the Eerste River and sold these to freed slaves from the 
farm Zandvliet. Some of these lots (35 to 39 constituting Erf 1177 Macassar) were sold to 
Abdul Wahab on behalf of the Mahamedan Congregation in 1862,
244
 and lot 54 was sold 
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to Christiaan Heuwel in 1867.
245
 The farm Zandvliet was later sold to Gerhardus 
Johannes Brand in 1865 and ownership was transferred once again in 1885 when 




On various title deeds the existence of the commonage was noted both in writing and in 
accompanying diagrams. The title deeds describe the lots as bounded in the south by 
commonage, and the accompanying diagram shows and clearly ascribes the commonage 
to lots 35 to 63 and determines its area as ‘164 Morgen 4.5 sq. roods’.
247
 A map dated 16 
July 1892 further indicates the commonage within the boundaries of the Zandvliet 
farm.
248
 Aside from the legal confirmation of the existence of the commonage on title 
deeds and administrative documentation, the commonage existed much more importantly 
as a communal area for the Zandvliet community. Due to the largely illiterate members of 
the community and the every-day nature of the usage of the commonage, there is no 
written documentation of the land’s utilisation. However, the history of the commonage 
and the community’s use of it are passed down within the community from generation to 
generation both orally and through the continuation of learned practices. As a result, oral 
history allows for a valuable insight into the nature of the community and its usage of the 
commonage.  
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The use of the commonage was of immense importance to the Sandvlei community. Due 
to the proximity of the plots to the Eerste River, in times of flood, the homes of the 
community were often under threat. The commonage served as an important refuge when 
the river was in flood, and some members even relocated their homes entirely onto the 
commonage.
249
 The Sandvlei community was economically dependent on subsistence 
farming, and the commonage was a large tract of land on which the community grazed 
cattle and other animals, especially in the winter months.
250
 The area was also used for 
various subsistence activities including: cutting wood, keeping poultry, growing 
vegetables, making charcoal, collecting herbs, hunting and trapping and provision of 




The Sandvlei community had shared rules of access to the commonage that were 
exclusive to their community and did not allow access to outsiders. Once again these 
rules were not written down, but were created and passed on by the elder generation of 
the community and constituted a shared understanding and consideration of all the 
members of the community.
252
 These rules included the stabilisation of the sand dunes, 
positioning of houses and the use of the land for grazing and the water for 
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 The community kept track of its members and communicated the rules 
during meetings and in sermons at the local Methodist church built on part of the 
commonage in 1879.
254
 The church was an integral institution for the community 
allowing for the creation of common rules and practices, and reinforcing communal 
cohesion.While the existence of the commonage was only peripherally recognised by the 
local administration over the decades, the commonage and the community’s access to it 
was central to sustaining the community’s way of life economically and culturally. As a 
result, deprivation of that commonage had a profound effect on the community’s 
continued reproduction.  
 
Cessation of the commonage and community restitution claim 
The Group Areas Act of 1950 achieved racial segregation by designating areas of land to 
particular racial groups and using forced removals in order to enact it. Under the Act, the 
Apartheid state held the pre-emptive right to ‘buy’ land held by non-whites and its 
primary vehicle for this process was the Community Development Board.  
 
Upon the designation of the Macassar area as a ‘coloured’ group area in 1964
255
 the 
Community Development Board sought to buy Zandvliet. This development prompted 
Faure to register a new diagram of the consolidated farm of Zandvliet that he had drawn 
up. In the process, the commonage was erased and simply included in the greater 
consolidated Zandvliet area. With the registration of the new diagram and title, the older 
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diagrams were cancelled and the commonage officially ceased to exist.
256
 As a result, 
when the Community Development Board purchased portion 108 of the Zandvliet farm in 
June 1975, the commonage was officially lost. While this initially made little difference 
to the community’s continued use of the commonage, this changed when the Macassar 
road, completed in 1983, physically severed the community from the commonage. 
Thereafter the commonage was fenced in to prevent access by…  
 
With South Africa’s transition to an inclusive democracy in 1994 a new legislative 
framework, including the Restitution of Land Rights Act,
257
 sought to address injustices 
such as those effected under Apartheid’s Group Areas Act. Under this Act the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was given power to investigate any claims of 
restitution. On 3 March 1997, J.A. De Wet lodged a restitution claim against Erf 1197 
Macassar on behalf of the Sandvlei community.
258
 After the death of De Wet, C. Wilters 
was elected chairman of the  Macassar Land Claims Committee and continued to 
represent the community and their restitution claim. The community’s claim to Erf 1197 





Maccsand and the legal battle in the Land Claims Court 
Maccsand (a BEE compliant company) was interested in mining sand from Erf 1197 
Macassar, and, after receiving its mining license from the Department of Minerals and 
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Energy, the company applied to the National Housing Board for a fixed term mineral 
lease agreement in order to allow the actual extraction of resources from Erf 1197. Since 
the area’s zoning designation was one of agricultural use, Maccsand needed to launch a 
zoning departure application with the Helderberg Administration, before beginning 
mining operations. M.G. Darries applied for the requisite zoning departure and was 
informed by the Chief of Town and Regional Planning for Helderberg Urban Planning, 
Housing and Development via letter in January 2000 that the processing of the departure 
might take up to seven months and that mining is not allowed until the actual rezoning 
has been approved and communicated.
260
 The processing of this departure was put on 
hold by the Helderberg administration after they were notified of the Macassar Land 
Claims Committee’s claim to Erf 1197 lodged at the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights. However, by the end of 2000 the Macasser community had become concerned at 
the visible development of mining activities on Erf 1197. The community sought legal 
advice and representation to put a stop to the mining activities. Legal proceedings began 





Rehana Khan Parker & Associates representing the Macassar Land Claims Commission 
appealed to the Land Claims Court for an interim interdict against Maccsand in order to 
stop the continued exploitation of land under claim by the Macassar community. The 
legal issues surrounding Maccsand’s continued mining were manifold. Firstly, due to the 
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fact that Erf 1197 had a restitution claim lodged against it, under the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act, the land was not allowed to be sold, leased, rezoned or developed without one 
month’s written notice of the intention to do so was given to the regional land claims 
commissioner.
262
 Secondly, Maccsand’s mining activities without the receipt of a zoning 
departure certificate from the Helderberg administration was in contravention of the Land 
Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO).
263
 Under LUPO, all land is zoned and designated a 
particular land use. In the case of Erf 1197, it was zoned under the Section 8 Zoning 
Scheme Regulations as an agricultural zone, which is the default zoning for all areas that 
have not been given a particular land use under Section 7 Zoning Regulations.  
Thirdly, permission for the departure of land use was required from the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Planning, something Maccsand had neglected to seekt. 
Effectively, Maccsand’s mining of Erf 1197 was in contravention of the Environmental 




Maccsand’s defence centred around trying to have the case thrown out on procedural 
irregularities. Among these was the fact that the papers were served at the address of one 
of Maccsand’s members rather than at the company’s official place of business. 
Furthermore, the Macassar Land Claims Committee’s case could not be deemed as one of 
urgency due to their building of the case over a six-month period. The Committee also 
failed to join certain parties that had a direct interest in the matter to the court 
proceedings. It was further disputed that the Macassar community was indeed a 
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community in any legal sense. Lastly, Maccsand’s defence disputed the Land Claims 
Court’s jurisdiction over the matter, as the issue at hand was one of illegal mining.  
 
On ruling on the matter, Judge Moloto chose to focus on the land claim and the mining’s 
detrimental influence this claim. In his judgement he declared that any procedural 
irregularities were not grave enough to void the claim made by the community, and was 
satisfied that the community had locus standi. Furthermore Moloto ruled that the 
community might indeed have a clear right to the property
265
 and that the mining on Erf 
1197 was causing irreparable harm to the claim of the MCLCC if it were to be successful. 
Moloto granted an interim interdict against Maccsand on 28 August 2003, preventing it 
from mining sand on Erf 1197 Macassar until the restitution of the land had been 
finalised.   
 
After Judge Moloto’s order was given, Maccsand submitted an application for leave of 
appeal, and continued its mining activities. Upon the community’s discovery of this fact, 
Moloto judged the interim interdict as un-appealable and found Maccsand in contempt of 
court during a telephonic conference involving representatives of Maccsand and the 
MLCC on 26 September 2003. As a result Maccsand was effectively barred from mining 
for a year until its appeal against the entire order of Moloto was heard before the 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal 
Macccsand’s appeal sought Moloto’s order to be rescinded or modified to allow further 
mining. Its representatives argued that the decision whether or not to allow mining (under 
the interim interdict) was in fact a separate issue from Macassar Land Claims 
Committee’s restitution claim, as the restitution granted by the Courts was not necessarily 
the specific land claimed, but might be financial compensation or the transfer of 
ownership of other state owned land. This, they argued, held particular weight in 
consideration of the new Minerals and Petroleum Resources Act (MPRA)
267
 under which 
control and ownership of resources no longer vests in the property, but in the state. As a 
result, Maccsand argued, even if the restitution claim were to be successful, this would 
not give the community a right to the sand resource on the land. It further argued that it 
was never given due notice of the contempt consideration and as a result were not given 
an opportunity to address the issue and prove their non-malevolence and wilfulness. 
Maccsand further insisted that the Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs legally 
endorsed its mining operations via its issuance of the requisite mining license and 
approval of Macsand’s Environmental Management Programme (EMP).
268
 It claimed that 
the Macassar Dunes Management Plan (MDMP)
269
 had designated the area within which 
Erf 1197 is located as suitable for mining, further endorsing Maccsand’s mining activity 
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under a structure plan for the Macassar area adopted in principal by the Helderberg 
administration.  
 
A panel consisting of Supreme Court Judges Farlam, Cameron, Nthyiane, Jafta and Patel 
heard Maccsand’s appeal and Judge Patel delivered its judgement on 30 November 2004. 
In its judgement the panel only concerned itself with the order given by Moloto and so 
made no deliberation on any possible illegality of Maccsand’s mining activities outside of 
the judgement of Moloto. The Judges found that the interim interdict in this case was 
appealable as the interdict ultimately had a final effect
270
 due to the slow progress made 
by the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights in finalising the restitution claim 
due to an admitted lack of funding.
271
 With consideration towards the new MPRA and its 
resulting divestment of mineral ownership from property ownership, the panel found the 
balance of convenience not as strongly in the MLCC’s favour as Moloto did in the Land 
Claims Court. The panel further found Moloto’s granting of a cost order irregular as the 
matter heard before Moloto was not the final hearing of the restitution claim and as such 
any cost order would be premature and unjust.
272
 The  Supreme Court of Appeal upheld 
but amended the order given by Moloto in such a way as to allow Maccsand to continue 
mining on strips B and C
273
 on condition that a sum of R120,000 was set aside into a trust 
fund for the rehabilitation of the mined strips as required by the Minerals Act of 1991 and 
that Maccsand remained in compliance with its approved EMP. Crucially, the Supreme 
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Court gave Maccsand leave to approach the Land Claims Court for a further variation of 
the order to allow the mining of further strips should the MLCC not proceed with its 
restitution claim within one year, ‘or as soon as the mining of strip B and C and the 
rehabilitation thereof is complete, whichever event should occur first’.
274
 The Supreme 
Court further upheld with costs Maccsand’s appeal against the contempt of court order 
given by Moloto and set aside the interim interdict’s cost award until the finalisation of 
the restitution claim.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement on the matter between the Macassar Land 
Claims Committee and Maccsand effectively allowed Maccsand to continue mining 
indefinitely, while the MLCC’s relative success towards ultimate restitution of Erf 1197 
was lost and incurred the costs of Maccsand’s appeal, taxed at R408,582.14.
275
 
Representing a poor community, the committee had no way of paying these costs. As a 
result, the Sheriff of Kuilsriver and Strand seized all moveable goods of the six members 
and prepared to put them to public auction.  
 
Immediately, the MLCC applied to the Land Claims Court to have the writ aginst the 
committee set aside. Hearing the matter on 1 June 2007, Judge Gildenhuys found that the 
Land Claims Court had no jurisdiction to order the writ of a higher court (the Supreme 
Court of Appeal) unlawful.
276
 He further argued, as Maccsand’s counsel had pointed out, 
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that the individual committee members were named in the original application by the 
MLCC and were thus liable to the cost order.
277
 As a result, Judge Gildenhuys denied the 
application and ordered the costs of appeal to be paid by the Macassar Land Claims 
Committee. After a lengthy process, the MLCC received the necessary financial aid from 
the Legal Aid Board to pay the requisite costs.  
 
Before the writ of execution was ordered against the MLCC members, the Committee 
had applied for a second interdict to be ordered against Maccsand in November 2006. 
This interdict was based on the strengthened claim of the Macassar community to Erf 
1197, due to the Committee for the Restitution of Land Rights’ detailed investigation into 
the claim. Effectively, the MLCC was proceeding with the claim for restitution, proving 
they had not assumed a ‘we do nothing’ position and once again attempted to have 
Maccsand’s mining stopped due to the harm caused to the community’s claim. Heard 
before Gildenhuys the application was dismissed for not carrying any substantive new 
arguments or evidence, and the Supreme Court of Appeals’ judgement was upheld.  
 
By June 2007, Maccsand was close to having mined out strips B and C and sought the 
Court’s support to mine further strips of land. The MLCC sought for a postponement and 
the joining of the Department of Environmental Affairs to the matter as an interested 
party.
278
 Judges Gildenhuys and Pienaar found insufficient grounds for a postponement. 
As to the joining of the Department of Environmental Affairs, Gildenhuys and Pienaar 
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found Maccsand’s possession of an approved mining license, which requires an approved 
Environmental Management Programme, as sufficient evidence for the granting of 
interim relief. The joinder of the Department of Environmental Affairs was denied as it 





As for the restitution claim and its impact on Maccsand’s mining operations, Gildenhuys 
and Pienaar once again relied on the framework set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and judged that while the MLCC’s restitution claim had prima facie right, though open to 
doubt, restitution of the original land was not guaranteed. Furthermore, under the new 
Minerals and Petroleum Resource Act, even if the restitution of Erf 1197 in particular 
were to succeed, the community would still not hold the right over the sand resources. In 
light of these facts, Gildenhuys and Pienaar once again judged the balance of 
convenience to be skewed if Maccsand was not allowed to continue mining, as its 
financial survival depended on the mining of Erf 1197. On 14 August 2007, Gildenhuys 
and Pienaar preserved the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order with the variation that 
Maccsand be allowed to mine strips C to F, on the condition that they remained in 
compliance with the approved EMP. Once again, Maccsand was given leave to approach 





                                                 
279
 Judgement of Gildenhuys and Pienaar on 14 June 2007, In the Land Claims Court of South 
Africa, Macassar Land Claims Committee vs Maccsand, Case Nr: LCC 37/03.  
280
 Judgement of Gildenhuys and Pienaar on 14 June 2007, In the Land Claims Court of South 
Africa, Macassar Land Claims Committee vs Maccsand, Case Nr: LCC 37/03. 
 100 
Upon the given order, the MLCC applied for leave to appeal the decision given by 
Gildenhuys and Pienaar in the Land Claims Court on 5 September 2007, claiming that 
Maccsand had not been in compliance with its approved Environmental Management 
Programme and that their rehabilitation of mining strips included the filling of building 
rubble, a practice strictly prohibited. The matter was heard on 5 October 2007 before 
Judge Gildenhuys to whom the progress of rehabilitation was within reason for the 
process may take years to complete after the end of mining activities. Furthermore, 
Maccsand’s legal obligation to rehabilitate the area as dictated by the approved EMP 
remained under the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs’ oversight, and its support 
of Maccsand’s application for variation was in Gildenhuys’ view sufficient evidence to 
rebut the MLCC’s claims. In light of these arguments, Gildenhuys denied the application 
for leave of appeal on 8 October 2007. In the meantime the Macassar community 
continued to wait for the Land Claims Court to rule on its application for the restitution of 
land. It is a possibility that the state may intervene by offering the community alternative 
land for the mined out Erf 1197.  
 
Conclusion 
Maccsand’s legal battle with the Macassar community over its continued mining is a 
complex issue with a twisting narrative. At the heart of the issue lies a community’s 
claim to a piece of land deeply integrated into its history and communal way of life and 
the exploitation of the same land by Maccsand, a BEE company some of whose members 
originate from the same community. The significance of the case lies in the way the state 
repeatedly supported Maccsand as a Black Economic Empowerment company against the 
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claim of a poor community’s claim to subsistence farming land. In this case, business 
interests were promoted through selective disregard of the spirit of the post-Apartheid 
constitution and environmental laws, and the effective denial of the rights of poor. The 
state, in the form of the Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs and others, actively 
supported Maccsand’s mining within a framework of promoting black economic 
empowerment. Also, Maccsand secured valuable government contracts as the large 
infrastructural projects in the Cape Metropolitan Area, in preparation for the hosting of 




In the long court proceedings surrounding the matter, the state’s own stance on mining 
and land restitution are contradictory and reflect the lack of coordination between 
departments with different responsibilities. This lack of coordination indicates the 
tensions within the state as departments are confronted with conflicting policies and 
jurisdictional unclarity. In the Maccassar case, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
was confronted by mining in breach of zoning and environmental laws supported by the 
Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs, whose appeal to the economic incentive of 
BEE appeared to take precedence. In the same way, tensions between provisional and 
national government structures are reflected, as the Helderberg Administration’s 
responsibility for the enforcement of local zoning laws being infringed upon by national 
state structures (particularly the DMEA). In the meantime, the Courts continue to act as 
arbiters of government policy, both extending and delimiting the boundaries of BEE 
interests vis-à-vis those of other, less empowered, communities. Clearly even Broad 
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Based Black Economic Empowerment is no guarantee that the interests of the poor will 
be served.  
  
Maccsand, as the Western Cape’s only BEE mining company, seemed to have benefited 
(or attempted to justify its own presence) from the competing jurisdictions of the state, 
and as the legal battle continued, Maccsand seemed to win ever greater support from the 
state. Throughout the continuation of the legal struggle, Maccsand (aside from a one year 
period) was allowed to continue its sand mining operations until the present– ultimately 
to the detriment of the Macassar community. While the court cases have focused on the 
interdiction of mining activities, the Maccassar community’s restitution claim is still to 
be resolved before the Land Claims Court. While the latest proposed settlement would 
provide the Macassar Claims community with large areas of land and represent a legal 
victory for the Macassar Land Claims Committee, the Macassar issue seemed to 
illuminate the ANC government’s willingness to undermine the law in favour of 
economic imperatives and in particular in this case, BEE.  
 
Maccsand has come into further conflict with provincial laws in a separate sand mining 
case whereby Maccsand was once again mining sand in environmentally sensitive, 
agriculturally zoned municipal area in Mitchells Plain.
282
 Once again obtaining a mining 
license from the DMEA via an undisclosed tender process, Maccsand ignored 
environmental and municipal zoning laws in its mining activities. In this case however 
the Western Cape High Court ruled in favour of the City of Cape Town and the Western 
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Cape MEC in August 2010, finding that the mining license does not exempt the BEE 
mining company from complying with any other relevant laws pertaining the actual land 
being mined.
283
 The High Court ruling came soon after a Constitutional Court ruling that 
stated that national or provincial spheres of government could not ‘give themselves the 
power to administer municipal affairs’.
284
 Once again the state supported Maccsand’s 
BEE status and the mining license under the MPRA to legitimise their mining activities 
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Afrikaner economic empowerment began around the turn of the century with small-scale 
accumulation of capital along ethnic line via community and political initiatives. In its 
earliest phase, this ethnic mobilisation of capital allowed the scattered wealth of the 
Afrikaner farmers to be consolidated into financial institutions which could thereafter 
promote the interests of Afrikaners in general and provide vehicles for economic 
empowerment. The ever-growing development of Afrikaner politics found voice in the 
National Party, which ultimately succeeded in winning state power in 1948. Once in 
power the National Party was able to make use of established Afrikaner capital as a 
platform for wide-scale empowerment of Afrikaner through state directed socio-
economic policies. 
 
Black Economic Empowerment developed slowly from the 1960s, being pushed by black 
business leaders and black business associations in an effort to combat restrictive 
Apartheid legislation on black business. While these business leaders represented 
political elites, they stood aside from the exiled ANC who was leading the African 
liberation movement and constituted the largest African political sphere. The Socialist 
nature of the ANC until the 1990s and the pro-business stance from black business 
leaders meant that the concept of BEE only entered into government policy once the 
ANC had turned towards liberal economics and a focus on growth. Even so, BEE’s 
entrance into policy was halting uneven, focusing at first on the state sector and passing 
broad BEE legislation only in 2003. Since then it has largely been negotiating the 
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detailed setting of BEE goals and benchmarks with the private sector as established 
business responded with initiatives of their own.  
 
The ANC faced the difficult task of addressing the huge structural inequalities in the 
stagnating economy it in inherited. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
growing acceptance of neo-liberal economic ideas in the world trade system, the ANC 
turned to market-oriented policies to establish an economic growth path, while 
simultaneously seeking to address transformation and redress with broader society. As 
the pro-business concept of BEE long operated in opposing discourse to the ANC’s 
political development, it lacked a solid foundation of ethnic capital and the relevant ethic 
on which to build a strong black middle class. 
 
The Black Economic Empowerment path the ANC took up was highly ‘top-down’ as it 
sought to use the state’s capacity to transfer wealth and wealth creating production to 
black ownership. Unlike Afrikaner empowerment, which was much more ‘bottom-up’ the 
ANC upon coming to state power did not have a strong foundation of black nationalist 
capital to base its Black Economic Empowerment efforts on. The ANC was dependent on 
use of state control to initiate wealth transfer and forcibly create a space for black 
business to operate in an economy dominated by white and international interests. While 
the policy of Black Economic Empowerment came under much scrutiny and criticism 
from political and business analysts, it remained a necessary and important tool for 
instating equitable conditions and redress.  
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The ANC’s top down approach to transformation via BEE has shown success in diluting 
the wealth of established white and foreign business, but showed limited success in 
enacting broad-based wealth creation and fundamental transformation due to the inherent 
tensions within BEE as a transformative policy. Afrikaner economic nationalism by 
contrast had much more small-scale, organic roots, which allowed for the creation of 
ethnic capital and business. It is important to remember that racially discriminatory 
legislation made the empowerment of an ethnic minority substantially easier for the 
National Party. However, BBBEE entrenches a path whereby the costs of a market-
oriented strategy is passed onto the poorest sector of society, while simultaneously 
projecting itself as a fundamentally transformative ‘broad-based’ strategy.  
 
The micro-studies of Maccsand and Intshinga Holdings provide an alternative perspective 
to the common broadly political approaches to BEE and its transformative power. The 
micro-studies show in particular how the ANC struggled to reconcile the contradictions 
inherent in its Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment strategy. The state’s 
promotion of BBBEE interests over those of the poor communities is indicative of its 
reluctance to engage with the contradictions in its policy in a deeply constructive way. 
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